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DIALOGIC FEDERALISM: CONSTITUTIONAL POSSIBILITIES
FOR INCORPORATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
IN THE UNITED STATES
CATHERINE POWELL'
Where, afterall, do universalrightsbegin? In small places, close to
home-so close and so small that theycannot be seen on any maps of
the world.... Unless these rightshave meaning there,theyhave little
meaning anywhere. Withoutconcerned citizenaction to uphold them
close to home,we shall look in vain forprogressin the largerworld.
-Eleanor Roosevelt

While the U.S. Constitutionassigns the power to make and adopt
treaties to the federal government,several state and local governments have "adopted" human rightstreatiesand other international
norms, oftenin response to constituentpressures that are more effectivelymobilized at the subnational level.2 For example, in the absence
of federal ratificationof the Convention on the Elimination of All

IAssociateClinicalProfessorof Law, ColumbiaLaw School; ExecutiveDirector,
Human RightsInstitute;B.A.,Yale University
(1987); M.P.A.,PrincetonUniversity,
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Eleanor Roosevelt, Address at a United Nations Ceremony in New York (Mar.
27, 1958), in Peter Meyer, The InternationalBill of Human Rights: A BriefHistory,at
http://paulwilliams.com/globalrights/history.html
(citation omitted).
2
I have put "adopted" in quotes because state and local governments cannot
technicallyadopt treaties,although they can incorporate international human rights
standards into state and local law simplyby enacting legislation reflectingthese norms.
While the Constitutionprovides that the President "shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate to make treaties,provided two thirdsof the Senators
present concur," U.S. CONST. art. II, ? 2, cl. 2, it specificallyprohibits state governments from making treatieswithout the consent of Congress, id. at art. I, ? 10, cl. 3.
For the purposes of this Article,I capitalize "States" to referto nation-statesin the international law sense, and de-capitalize "states" to referto the 50 states of the United
States.
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Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) , San Francisco
has incorporated "principles of CEDAW" into binding local law.4 In
the death penalty context,where the federal governmenthas not yet
opted to ratifythe Second Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Second Optional Protocol to
the ICCPR),' aimed at the abolition of the death penalty,a handful of
cities have urged their states, and in some cases the federal government, to support a moratorium,relyingon the United Nations Com6
mission on Human Rights'call forsuch a moratorium.
What are the constitutionalimplications of this and other moves
to bypass the federal governmentin incorporatingand enforcinginternationalhuman rights? Discussions about the allocation of authoritybetween federal and subfederal systemsin the implementation of
internationalhuman rightslaw typicallyproceed by stakingout one of
two initialpositions.7 At one end of the spectrum,a traditionalconstitutional theorytakes a restrictiveview of state and local authority,envisioning hierarchical imposition of federallyimplemented international law norms throughthe federal treatypower8and determination

AgainstWomen,
Conventionon theEliminationofAll Formsof Discrimination
CEDAW].
Dec. 18, 1979,1249U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter
signature
openedfor
the
CAL., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, ch. 12K (2001) (providing
SeeSANFRANCISCO,
oftheUnitedNationsConvenlocal San Franciscolawentitled"Local Implementation
AgainstWomen (CEDAW)"),
tionon the Eliminationof All Formsof Discrimination
available at http://www.amlegal.com/sanfranadmin/lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=mai
j.htm&2.0.
Covenanton Civiland Political
Second OptionalProtocolto the International
Rights,Aimingat the Abolitionof the Death Penalty,U.N. GAOR 3rd Comm.,54th
in 1989 U.N.Y.B.484. For
Sess.,Annex,at 14, U.N. Doc. A/44/824(1989), reprinted
Congressionaldiscussionon the rejectionof the Second Optional Protocol,see U.S.
Covenanton Civil
and Declarationsto theInternational
Understandings,
Reservations,
U.S. RUDs to the
and PoliticalRights,138 CONG. REC. 8068,8071 (1992) [hereinafter
Covenanton Civiland Political
ICCPR]. For the treatyitself,see the International
Dec. 16, 1966,S. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2,at 23, 999 U.N.T.S. 172,
signature
Rights,openedfor
ICCPR].
173 [hereinafter
text.
notes157-60and accompanying
Fordiscussion,see infra
deI have adapteddiscussionof the following
twopositionsfroma framework
in thecontextof habeas corvelopedbyRobertM. Coverand T. AlexanderAleinikoff
humanrightslaw context. SeeRobertM. Cover& T.
pus law to fitthe international
Alexander Aleinikoff,DialecticalFederalism: Habeas Corpusand the Court,86 YALE L.J.

in thecontextofhabeas corpuslaw,
1035,1047 (1997) (makinga similarobservation
in whichtwoparadigmsweredevelopedand defended: "a model of hierarchicalimvalue
justifying
determined
values;and a modeloffragmentation,
positionoffederally
choicesbythestates"). I am indebtedtoJudithResnikforbringingthisarticleto my
attention.
The SupremeCourthas opined,"No doubt the greatbodyof privaterelations
usuallyfallwithinthe controlof [a] state,but a treatymayoverrideits power." Mis-
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of customaryinternationallaw} byfederal courts.'0At the other end of
the spectrum,a revisionisttheoryassumes greater fragmentationand
authorityreserved to the statesbased on federalismand separation of
powers limitson federal authority." "These divergentimages capture
souriv. Holland,252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920) (holdingthatthe treatypowerauthorizes
Congressto legislateunder the Necessaryand ProperClause in areas beyondthose
and thatthe
specifically
conferredin Article1, Section8, of the U.S. Constitution
seealsoMartinS.
treatypoweris not subjectto mostTenthAmendmentlimitations);
70 U.
Flaherty,Are We to Be a Nation? FederalPowervs. "States'Rights"in ForeignAffairs,

COLO. L. REV.1277, 1280 (1999) (arguingthatthe "federalforeignaffairsauthority
state
does and shouldtrumptheprohibition
againstthenationalgovernment
enlisting
and theNation: The HistoricalFoundationsof
officials");David M. Golove, Treaty-Making
theNationalistConception
oftheTreatyPower,98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1314 (2000) ("[T]he

in the
nationalistconceptionof the treatypower... findsits ultimatejustification
in the
Founders'decisionto lodge thewholeof theforeignaffairs
powersexclusively
nationalgovernment.").
law resultsfroma generaland consistentpracticeof
"Customary
international
(THIRD)OF
[s]tatesfollowedbythemfroma senseoflegalobligation."RESTATEMENT

THE FOREIGNRELATIONSLAWOF THE UNITED STATES? 102 (1986).
See, e.g., Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks,Filartiga'sFirmFooting: International
Human Rightsand FederalCommonLaw, 66 FORDHAML. REV. 463, 529 (1997) ("[F]or

nearlytwenty
years,thefederalgovernment
... has spokenwithone voiceon thestatus
of [customary
international
law (CIL)] in U.S. law: [u]niversally-recognized
human
rightsarejudicially-cognizable
federallaw.");Louis Henkin,International
Law as Law in
theUnited
States,
82 MICH. L. REV.1555,1569 (1984) ("[T]he law of nations,whichis
of the U.S. nation,should be seen as incorporatedin our national
the responsibility
Law
jurisprudenceas national(federal)law."); Harold Hongju Koh, Is International
of
ReallyStateLaw?,111 HARV.L. REV.1824,1824 (1998) (" U]udicialdeterminations
international
law-includinginternational
human rightslaw-are mattersof federal
law."); Gerald L. Neuman, Senseand NonsenseAboutCustomary
InternationalLaw: A Re66 FORDHAML. REV. 371, 376-77(1997) ("InsponsetoProfessors
Bradleyand Goldsmith,

corporationat the federallevel respectsthe nationalcharacterof foreignrelations:
the [s]tatesare not entitledto adopt individualapproachesto international
law.");

Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary
InternationalLaw as FederalLaw After
Erie,66 FORDIIAML. REV.393, 397 (1997) (arguingthat"the determination
of the

contentof customary
international
law and of whetheror not it applies in a given
situationis a federalquestion,whichtriggers
federalcourtjurisdictionand on which
federalcourtdecisionsare bindingon thestates").
See, e.g.,Curtis A. Bradley &Jack L. Goldsmith, III, The CurrentIllegitimacy
ofInternationalHuman RightsLitigation,66 FORDHAML. REV. 319, 349 (1997) [hereinafter

Bradley& Goldsmith,
Current
Illegitimacy]
(contending,
based on thefamousproclamationin E'rieRailroadCo. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), that"[t]here is no federal
ofCIL are questionsofstatelawwhich
generalcommonlaw,"and thatdeterminations
"federalcourtsshouldnotapply. . . as federallawwithoutsomeauthorization
to do so
by the federalpoliticalbranches");CurtisA. Bradley& JackL. Goldsmith,Customary
InternationalLaw as FederalCommonLaw: A CritiqueoftheModernPosition,110 HARV.L.
REV. 816, 816-21 (1997) [hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith, Critiqueof the Modern

Position](characterizing
the traditionalapproach-which assumesCIL is a typeof
federalcommon law-as a "modernposition"thatis inconsistent
withfederalism;
courtsshould not applyCIL as federallaw unlessauthorizedto do so by the federal
political branches); JackL. Goldsmith,FederalCourts,ForeignAffairs,and Federalism,
83
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momentsof politicalpromiseand despair,at timesfocused
different
on the immensepowerof the nationalproject,and othertimesappreciatingthe vitalityand durabilityof formsof governancethat,

without . . . great resources, continue to have social and political
force."'2

Under both models,one system-eitherfederalor subfederalhuhas a predominantvoice in decidingwhenand howinternational
man rightslaw is implemented.Such either/orapproachesseek to
of
createdwhenthedistribution
avoidtheconflictand indeterminacy
is uncertain.' At the traditional/hierarchical
authority
constitutional
withtheabilityof the
theconflictis interference
end of thespectrum,
posed by "divernationto speak with"one voice" in foreignaffairs,14
of international
gent and perhaps parochial state interpretations"
at itscore,is
end, the conflict,
law.' At the revisionist/fragmentation
FederalCourts](arguingthatthe
Goldsmith,
VA.L. REV.1617,1622 (1997) [hereinafter
federal common law of foreignrelationsas currentlypracticedby courts and
Power
seealsoCurtisA. Bradley,TheTreaty
understoodbyscholarslacksjustification);
Bradley,Treaty
97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 394 (1998) [hereinafter
and AmericanFederalism,
Power](arguingthatthe unlimitedpowerof treatymakersoverstatesis inconsistent
withAmericanfederalism).
12
judith Resnik,Afterword:Federalism'sOptions,14 YALEL. & POL'Y REV. 465, 500
a New Federalism:Jurisdictional
on "Constructing
(1996) (concludinga symposium
Competence").
and
Comvetition
supranote 7, at 1047 ("Bothparadigmscreatea sense
SeeCover& Aleinikoff,
are dysfunctional.").
and indeterminacy
thatconflict
14
See,eg., Crosbyv. Nat'l ForeignTrade Council,530 U.S. 363, 381 (2000) (emphasizingtheneed forthePresidentto speakforthenationwithone voicein dealing
Boylev. UnitedTechs. Corp.,487 U.S. 500, 508 n.4 (1988)
withothergovernments);
federalinterestin ... the exteriorrelationof thiswhole nation
(finding"distinctive
(internalquotationmarksand citationsomitwithothernationsand governments"
ted)); JapanLine, Ltd.v. Countyof Los Angeles,441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979) ("'In interand tradethepeople of the
nationalrelationsand withrespectto foreignintercourse
withunifiedand adequate national
United Statesact througha singlegovernment
power."'(quotingBd. ofTrs.ofUniv.of Ill. v. UnitedStates,289 U.S. 48, 59 (1933)));
J.,concurring)(" [T] he conZschernigv. Miller,389 U.S. 429, 437-38(1968) (Stewart,
to the NationalGovduct of our foreignaffairsis entrustedunder the Constitution
notforlocal probatecourtsof theseveralstates.");UnitedStatesv. Belmont,
ernment,
301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) ("Governmental power over external affairsis not distributed,
but is vested exclusively in the national government. And... the Executive ha[s]
authorityto speak as the sole organ of thatgovernment.").
15
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964). The Court

withothermembersof the international
also statedthat"orderingour relationships
relied
as an aspectoffederallaw." Id. Sabbatino
mustbe treatedexclusively
community
on an influentialarticleby Professor(later InternationalCourt of JusticeJudge)
in Erie,
PhillipC. Jessup,who argued thatJusticeBrandeis'famouspronouncement
304 U.S. at 78, that"[t]here is no federalgeneralcommonlaw,"had (in Jessup's
of
law." PhilipC. Jessup,TheDoctrine
words)"no directapplicationto international
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to InternationalLaw, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 740, 741
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withstates'rightsby federalcourts(withoutauthorizainterference
tion to do so by the federalpoliticalbranches)and by the political
powerto
Congress,whenit exercisesthe treaty
branches(particularly
conferredin the U.S. Conlegislatein areas beyondthosespecifically
Article1, Section8)."' While the twoparadigmsdescribed
stitution,
and hybridity
within
the subtlety
here are idealized and oversimplify
theseparadigms,in factmuch of the scholarshipon federalismand
humanrightslawin the UnitedStateslooselytracksone or the other
ofthesetwomodels,ifnotalwaysin itspurestform.
This Articlearguesfora thirdapproach,premisedon dialogue
relationsas a wayto negotiate,ratherthan
and intergovernmental
This approachlinksnationaland
avoid,conflictand indeterminacy."
in a dialogueabout rightsby"creat[ing]arsubnationalgovernments
eas of overlapin whichneithersystemcan claim totalsovereignty."1
wheredifThe dialogueemergesin theseareasofoverlap,particularly
ferencesarise in the extentto whichnationaland subnationalgovernmentsincorporatehuman rightsobligations. Conflictand inde-

(1939). For more recent discussion of the same point, see Koh, supranote 10, at 1832,
arguing that designating state courts as the primaryinterpretersof CIL "would have
raised the specter that multiple variantsof the same internationallaw rule could proliferateamong the several states."
Bradley & Goldsmith, Critiqueof theModernPosition,supra note 11; Bradley &
Goldsmith, Current
Illegitimacy,
supranote 11.
17Cover & Aleinikoff,supra note 7, at 1048 (proposing a model of federal-state
interaction and dialogue to address conflictand indeterminacyin the context of habeas law). For discussion about the need for a new dynamic approach to federalism
generally, see, for example, MICHAEL D. REAGAN& JOHN G. SANZONE,THE NEW
FEDERALISM3 (2d ed. 1981), stating: "Federalism-old style-is dead. Yet federalism-new style-is alive and well and livingin the United States. Its name is intergovernmental relations." I view the third approach offered here as consistent with an
emerging body of scholarship on federalismand human rightslaw located along the
middle of the spectrum described above. This emerging body of scholarship includes,
for example, JudithResnik, CategoricalFederalism:Jurisdiction,
Gender,and theGlobe,111
YALE L.J. (forthcoming2001) (arguing thatwe should be less categorical about allocation of authoritybetween national and subnational governments); and PeterJ. Spiro,
The Statesand International
Human Rights,66 FoRDHAML. REv. 567, 568-69 (1997) (arguing for direct liabilityfor subnational entities-state and local governments-under
international law, as well as authorityfor these entities to "discreetlyassociate with
formal human rightsregimes"). Aspects of scholarship that incline toward the traditional end of the spectrum indicate sympathyfor the hybriditycaptured by the middle
of the spectrum. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 10, at 1858 (noting that a "zero-sumimage
of state-federalcompetition leads Bradley and Goldsmith to downplay the multiple
channels through which international human rightsnorms trickledown to the states
from the federal government"). However, the approach outlined in this Article suggests thatthese norms trickleup as well as down.
Cover & Aleinikoff,supranote 7, at 1048.
h
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terminacy are desired conditions, so long as mechanisms exist to
channel and resolve these differencesand ambiguities,as a means of
clarifyingand articulating international human rights domestically.
By contrast,where one systemhas sovereigntyto act withoutthe consensus and support of the other, the reach of international human
rights law lacks both depth and breadth.
Under the traditional/hierarchical model, human rights law lacks depth and concreteness because the democratic deficit inherent in the formation
and ratificationof treaties1~disables the federal government from
gaining support for human rightsat the state and local level. Under
the revisionist/fragmentation
model, human rightslaw lacks breadth
and national impact in the absence of some formof national cooperation and coordination. By requiring intergovernmentalcooperation
and dialogue, the thirdapproach offeredhere facilitatesthe difficult
process of workingout how to convertabstractinternationallaw principles into concrete,workable domestic laws and policies withnational
reach.
I call thisarrangement"dialogic federalism"because it is based on
the assumption that dialogue among various levels of governmentis
critical to meaningful implementation of internationalhuman rights
law in the United States.'OIt also assumes that engagement in this intergovernmentaldialogue occurs hand in hand withdialogue between
and among various international,national, and subnational actors and
of the internaconstituencies. Rather than facilitatemere transmission
of international, then, thisapproach envisionsa process of translation
tional to national.21 "Justas we know that translationfrom one language to another requires more than literalness,we must recognize
and thereforethe uncertainty,involved in domestic inthe creativity,
terpretation[of internationallaw.]"22 Afterall, while translationowes

See infranotes 28, 92-94 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of public
process).
access to and engagement in the treaty-making
2I
am gratefulto Kendall Thomas, who identifiedthe term "dialogic federalism"
in valuable comments he provided to me on an earlier draft of this Article. While
Cover and Aleinikoff,supra note 7, call the conceptual frameworkthey developed in
the habeas context "dialectic federalism,"I prefer the phrase "dialogic federalism"in
the context I address here, to stressthe central importance of dialogue in implementing international norms, the legitimacyof which is questioned prior to democratic
consideration and adoption of these norms.
SeeKaren Knop, Hereand There: InternationalLaw in DomesticCourts,32 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 501, 504-05 (2000) (arguing that genuine domestic incorporation of
internationallaw involvesmore than "a conveyorbelt that delivers internationallaw to
the people").
22
Id. at 506.

2001]

DIALOGICfEL)ERALISM

251

fidelityto the other's language and text (the "other" here being international law), it also requires assertion of one's own language as well
("one's own" being domestic law) 23 "The ideal is thus neither wholly
international nor wholly national, but a hybrid that expressles] the
relationshipbetween them."24The negotiation between international
and domestic legal regimes, and the hybriditywhich results,are the
driving forces behind translation of broad international principles
into concrete articulation of rightsreflecteddomesticallyin law and
practice .

The translationmetaphor is central to the model of dialogue envisioned in this Article,because it captures the foreignnessthat many
Americans associate with internationallaw. As a formal matter,ratified treatiesand customaryinternationallaw are law of the land in the
United States.)'" As a practical matter,however,internationallaw is often viewed as an alien source of law, lacking democratic legitimacy.
This latterview is reflectedin Supreme Courtjurisprudence.2' Translation frominternationalto domestic law through broad-based democratic deliberation and discussion is necessary to address the democratic deficitinherent in the waysinternationallaw is implemented in
the United States. While particular democratic deficitscharacterize
lawmaking processes in the United States generally,2this Article argues that the problem is aggravated in the making and implementation of internationallaw because of lack of transparencyin the international processes in which treaties are negotiated as well as in the
domestic processes by which treatiesare ratifiedby the Senate, without input from the House, unlike purelydomestic legislation. By allowing incorporation of internationallaw through multiple points of

Id. (citing JAMES BOND WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION:
CULTURAL. AND LEGAL CRITICISM264 (1990)).
24

AN ESSAY IN

Id.

to Theory,NEW FORMATIONS,
Cf. id. (citing Homi K. Bhabha, The Commitment
Summer 1988, at 5, 22 (stating "that it is the 'inter'-the cuttingedge of translation
and negotiation" that opens a space in which "we will find those words withwhich we
can speak of Ourselves and Others")).
2For discussion see inra notes 49-50, 52 and accompanying text.
2
For discussion see infranotes 51, 53 and accompanying text.
28 See,e.g.,JERRY L.
MASHAW,GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC
CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 12 (1997) ("[T]he message [of public choice literature] is ... about whypolitical markets cannotwork to satisfythe democratic wish,that
is, to provide the people with the governmentthat theywant."); Koh, supra note 10, at
1854 (describing domestic federal legislation as "a process notoriouslydominated by
committees, strong-willedindividuals, collective action problems, and private rentseeking").
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entry,dialogic federalism facilitatestranslation at various sites with
broader participation, ensuring thicker,more complex understandings of human rightslaw.
This dialogic approach is both descriptiveand prescriptive. It is
descriptivein that it theorizes by looking at existingintergovernmental collaboration and dialogue. Dialogic federalismis also prescriptive
in thatit encourages state and local participationeven where none exists and posits a constitutionalanalysis about this participation. The
constitutional analysis draws inspiration from scholarship on democratic experimentalism,a theoryof American constitutionalismthat
reinterpretsdemocratic deliberation as a means of reducing the dis.
tance between two visions of the Constitution
One vision rests on
the Madisonian ideal of limited governmentbased on complex divisions of powers.30The other restson the New Deal synthesisinvolving
an all-powerfulCongress thatdelegates much of its authorityto expert
agencies, which are presumably checked throughjudicial oversight
when rightsare violated.31 Dialogic federalismextends this theoryby
investigatingnew modes of democratic deliberation in the context of
domestic implementation of internationalhuman rightslaw. In the
international human rightscontext, these new modes of democratic
deliberation must resolve the tension between the Madisonian project's commitmentto decentralizing authorityng
and the fact that the
Constitutioncreated national institutions"preciselyto avoid such balkanization of foreignpolicyand internationalaffairs."'3

See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution
ofDemocraticExperimentalism,98 COLUM. L. REv. 267, 289 (1998) (conceiving of a new decentralized vision of
government, "democratic experimentalism," through which the federal government
partners with state and local governments to facilitatemore participatoryand democratic modes of lawmaking).
M
Id. at 289.
31
Id. at 290-91.
32
Dorf and Sabel assert:
Madison's understandingof the crucial role of power allocation led him to believe that "[t]he end of constitutional [as opposed to statutory]interpretation
was to determine which branch or level of governmentpossessed the rightto
act in a particular area of governance, and in doing so, to preserve the equilibriumamong institutionsthat the Constitutionintended to establish."
Id. at 289 n.66 (quotingJAcKN. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN
THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 345 (1996)).

Koh, supranote 10, at 1841. In fact Madison was aware of thisveryneed for national institutions. See id. at 1825 n.4 (citing THE FEDERALISTNo. 42, at 264 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossitered., 1961), and indicating that "[b]oth Edmund Randolph
and James Madison complained at the Constitutional Convention about the Constitutional Congress's inabilityto give effectto the law of nations under the Articlesof Con-
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As a constitutional thesis, dialogic federalism reveals what both
models fail
the traditional/hierarchicaland revisionist/fragmentation
to fully capture and offersa normative frameworkfor negotiating
(rather than avoiding) the conflict and indeterminacyinherent in
overlapping jurisdiction between national and subnational govern4
ments. While these other models anticipate overlappingjurisdiction,
both seek to avoid possible conflictsthroughtrumps: federal supremacy at one end of the spectrum,and states' rightsat the other. By contrast,dialogic federalismembraces conflictand utilizes it productively
through reliance on dialogue, coordination, and negotiation, rather
than trumps. By advancing a more consensus-based process that depends on multiple and concurrent levels of deliberation, this approach seeks to address shortcomings inherent in both federallyimposed mandates (which often fail to gain support at the state and
local level)'' and fragmentedstate and local initiatives(which often
fail to translateinto full-scalenational compliance with international
human rightslaws absent coordination and dialogue).
In offeringa preliminarysketchof dialogic federalism,thisArticle
is a firststep in a larger theoreticalproject concerning a core dilemma
confrontingthe human rightsproject: how to square the idea of universal internationalstandards with the tendency toward localism and
particularity." Often asserted as a reaction to globalization, regional
integration,and harmonization, localism (or, in the European context,"subsidiarity")resistshomogenization and seeks to protectdiversityand differenceamong national and subnational systems. Localism, therefore,asserts that decision making should be on the lowest
possible level, and involve individuals,as opposed to their representatives,to the greatestextent possible. The initial conclusion which is
introduced here, but which clearly requires furtherdevelopment, is
that a federated society such as the United States (or the European
Union) will be better equipped to resolve these tensions by developing methods of democratic deliberation thatbridge, on the one hand,
the society's structuralpermeability to international human rights
federation").
34
For example, these competingparadigmsanticipateboth federaland state
courtshavingjurisdiction
(thoughnotalwaysconcurrently)
overCIL.
'' The backlashagainstaffirmative
action,busing,and otherfederally-imposed
civilrightsremediesmightbe read as a failureof top-down
approaches,absentefforts
to gainsupportat thestateand local level.
'' I have exploreda relatedclash betweenuniversality
and culturalrelativism
in

Catherine Powell, LocatingCulture,Identity
and Human Rights,30 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L.
REv. 201 (1999).
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norms through multiple points of entrywith,on the other hand, the
coordination and extractionof these norms at the national level.
This Articlequestions the efficiencyof enabling fiftydifferentlegislative campaigns to promote human rightsstandards, rather than
one. By the same token, this piece asks whether there can be any
shortcuts.:3 While I do not have any empirical evidence at thisstage of
myproject to suggestwhetheror not state and local processes are more
open to individualswho wish to engage in standard setting,my argument is simplythat "localizing" internationalhuman rightslaw creates
opportunities for standard setting that supplement, solidify, and
deepen opportunitiesat the federal level)8
Even assuming that the federal government undertook greater
leadership in ratifyingadditional human rightstreaties,in more fully
implementingthose it has not ratified,or in withdrawingreservations
to treatyprovisions,the argument here is that there would still be a
value in state and local participation. By enabling democratic deliberation at multiple levels,dialogic federalismfacilitatesa broader and
deeper consensus over human rightscommitments.At the same time,
this approach depends on some form of coordination at the federal
level, either by the federal government,a national network of state
and local governments,or a national nongovernmentalstructure. Because this paradigm relies on state and local governmentadoption of
human rightsstandards as a supplement or enhancement to (not as a
replacement or diminution of) the role of the federal government,it
contrastswiththe position taken by revisionistinternationallaw scholars. In arguing that the federal government's abilityto implement,
interpret,and enforce internationallaw should be limited on grounds
of federalismand separation of powers, these scholars would disable,
ratherthan bolster,federal authority.:M
Part I of this Article describes current challenges, in which the
I wouldlike to acknowledgeEyalBenvenistiforraisingtheseimportantquestionsin helpfulcommentson an earlierdraftofthisArticle.
38
Cf Mark Tushnet, KeepingYourEye on theBall: The Significanceof theRevival of
13 GA.ST. U. L. REv. 1065, 1069-71(1997) (suggestingthat
Federalism,
Constitutional
networks
mightbe
and transnational
enablinglinksbetweensubnationalgovernments
a wayofreducingthedemocraticdeficitin Americanpolitics).
See,e.g.,Bradley & Goldsmith, CritiqueoftheModernPosition,supranote 11, at 870

[CIL]
("We havearguedthat,in theabsenceoffederalpoliticalbranchauthorization,
supranote
Illegitimacy,
is not a sourceof federallaw.");Bradley& Goldsmith,Current
intofedincorporated
11,at 368-69("[T]he ... viewthatthenewCIL is automatically
values.... [C] urrent
constitutional
withfundamental
eral commonlawis inconsistent
rulesof the new CIL of
of substantive
federalstatutesdo not supportincorporation
humanrights.").
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public is largely disengaged from the primary processes through
which human rightslaw is incorporated by the federal government,
because these processes discourage direct,broad-based deliberation of
subject matterviewed as highlytechnical and not immediatelyapplicable to people's daily lives. Part II investigatesdialogic federalismas
a possible solution. Part III describes three differenttypesof dialogic
federalismand provides case studies illustratingthe firstand most frequent formin which state and local governmentsadopt international
human rightsstandards where the federal governmenthas failed to
ratifya treaty.Part IV of thisArticlelocates dialogic federalismwithin
the context of other scholarship on domestic incorporation of international law in the United States and points to its contributionas an
alternateframework.
I.

CURRENT CHALLENGES

In other areas of law, scholars applaud what theydescribe as new
formsof governance, in which power is decentralized away from the
national governmentto enable citizens and other actors to utilize local knowledge in craftingsolutions that more tightlyfitlocal circumstances.40Yet, in the realm of internationallaw, the predominant view
is that the federal governmenthas a virtualmonopoly in foreign affairsand in the development of the two main sources of public international law-treaties and customaryinternational law.4' This view
(represented in the traditional/hierarchicalmodel described above)
is overwhelmingly
supported by the Framers'vision of the nation,42the

See, e.g.,Dorf& Sabel, supra note 29 (describing
roleforstateand local governmentsto workin partnership
withthe federalgovernment
to facilitateparticipatory
and democraticapproachesto lawmaking).
Butsee infraPartIV fordiscussionofopposingviewsofrevisionist
scholars.
42
See,e.g.,THE FEDERALISTNo. 80,at 476 (AlexanderHamilton)(ClintonRossiter

ed., 1961) ("[T]he peace of the WHOLE ought not to be left at the disposal of a
PART. The Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct
of its members."); THE FEDERALISTNo. 42, at 264 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) ("If we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect
to othernations.");Henkin,supra note 10, at 1559 n.19 (quoting 2 THE FEDERALIST

No. 42, at 50 (JamesMadison) (NewYork,1788)), in whichJamesMadison"justified
the clause in the Constitution
givingauthority
to Congressto defineoffensesagainst

the law of nations and criticized the absence of such authorization in the Articles of
Confederation, which 'consequently [left] it in the power of any indiscreet member
[i.e., state] to embroil the confederacywith other nations"'); id. at 1560 n.22 (quoting
2 THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 305 (Alexander Hamilton) (New York, 1788), in which
"Alexander Hamilton cites 'cases arising upon treaties and the laws of nations' as
proper for thejurisdiction of federal courts").
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Constitution," international law,44and Supreme Court precedent reflectingconstitutionaland policy considerations regarding the need
for the nation to speak with "one voice" in foreign affairs.45 "Every
schoolchild knows that the failures of the Articles of Confederation
led to the framing of the Constitution,which established national
governmental institutionsto articulate uniform positions on such
uniquely federal matters as foreign affairsand international law."46
However, these institutions-federal courts (in the context of litigation based on customaryinternational law or treatyclaims) and the
Senate and executive branch (in the treaty-makingcontext)-discourage direct broad-based participation. The relative absence of
public engagement in these institutionscontributesto the failure of
these institutionsto translatefullyinternationallaw into domestic law.
For a discussion of additional historical evidence, see FREDERICKW. MARKS III,
INDEPENDENCEON TRIAL: FOREIGNAFFAIRSAND THE MAKINGOF THE CONSTITUTION
200-06 (2d ed., Scholarly Res. Inc. 1986) (1973), explaining the significanceof foreign
affairsin the creation of the Constitution,and the Framers' view of a strong central
government;and Flaherty,supra note 8, at 1309-15, noting the Founders' commitment
to nationalism in the realm of foreignaffairs.
CompareU.S. CONST. art. II, ? 2, cl. 2 (stating that the President has power, "with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the
Senators present concur"), and id. at art. I, ? 8, cl. 10 (authorizing a national instittution, Congress, "[t]o define and punish ... Offensesagainst the Law of Nations"), with
id. at art. I, ? 10, cls. 1-2 (banning statesfrommaking treaties,alliances, agreements,or
compacts withforeignpowers withoutthe consent of Congress; prohibitingstatesfrom
engaging in war unless actually invaded; and forbidding them from laying imposts or
duties on importsor exports withoutthe consent of Congress).
Jessup, supra note 15, at 741-43 (noting that the several states of the Union are
entitiesunknown to internationallaw). But see infranotes 207, 210 and accompanying
text (discussing the limited ways in which subnational governments in the United
States and Germany have participated in international agreements and regional arrangements).
4See supra notes 14-15 (citing examples of Supreme Court opinions supporting
the "one voice" approach to foreignaffairs);seealso United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203,
232 (1942) ("If state action could defeat or alter our foreign policy, serious consequences might ensue. The nation as a whole would be held to answer if a [s]tate created difficultieswitha foreignpower.").
Koh, supranote 10, at 1825; seealso id. at 1825 n.4 (citing complaints by "[b]oth
Edmund Randolph andJames Madison ... at the ConstitutionalConvention about the
Continental Congress's inabilityto give effectto the law of nations under the Articles
of Confederation"); MARKS,supra note 42, at 145 ("The lesson was clear: there was
need for a strong national executive, and such an office would prove effective.");
RAKOVE, supra note 32, at 29 ("[A]s most proposals to amend the Articles sought to
free Congress from its debilitating dependence on the states, the agenda of national
reformseemed designed to reduce rather than strengthenthe connections between
state and national politics."); 1 THE RECORDSOF THE FEDERALCONVENTIONOF 1787, at
24-25, 316-17 (Max Farrand ed., 1966) (noting the inabilityof the Articlesof Confederation to control State relationswithforeignnations).
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In thejudicial context,while some judges in the United States are
deeply engaged with internationallaw,47mostjudges are reluctantto
apply these norms.38 This is the case even though ratified human
rights treaties and customaryinternational law are both law of the
land in the United States.4' Under the Supremacy Clause, the law of
the land is binding on the federal governmentsas well as on state and
local governments.50 Even so, some judges dismissthe relevance of internationallaw claims or are openly hostile to them. While ratified

4Se, e.g.,Breardv. Pruett,134 F.3d 615 (4thCir. 1998) (affirming
district
court's
denial of federalhabeas reliefto petitionerraisingprocedurally
barredVienna Conventionclaim), cert.deniedsub nom.,Breardv. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 380 (1998)
fromdenial of certiorari)(findingforeignnational'sargument
(Breyer,
J.,dissenting
forstayof executionnot whollywithoutmeritwherethe UnitedStatessubmitted
an
amicusbriefacknowledging
thattheVienna Conventionon ConsularRelations,done
Apr.24, 1963,art.42, 21 U.S.T. 77, 104,596 U.N.T.S. 261, 296,had been violatedbecause theforeignnationalwasnotnotifiedofhisrightto communicate
withhisconsulate); RuthBader Ginsburg& DeborahJonesMerritt,
Fifty-First
CardozoMemorial
Lecture: Afrfirative
Action: An InternationalHuman RightsDialogue, 21 CARDOZO L. REV.

awarenessoftherelevanceofinterna253,281-82(1999) (reflectingJustice
Ginsburg's
tionalhumanrightslaw domestically);
seealsoThompsonv. Oklahoma,487 U.S. 815,
830-31 (1988) (Stevens,J.) (relyingon the lawsof othernationsin interpreting
the
EighthAmendment
in a juveniledeathpenaltycase involving
a fifteen-year-old);
MARY
L. DUDZIAK,COLD WARCIvIL RIGHTS90-102(2000) (highlighting
evidencethatin the
1950s,theSupremeCourtmayhavebeen swayedbyargumentsin theJusticeDepartment'sbriefsindicatingthatsegregation
threatenedtherole of theUnitedStatesas a
globalleaderfordemocracy).
48 See Eyal Benvenisti,Judicial MisgivingsRegardingthe Applicationof International
Law: An AnalysisofAttitudesofNational Courts,4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 159, 160-75 (1993)

(discussingreasonsthatpromptmostnationalcourtsto approachinternational
norms
and limittheirapplicationwithinnationallegalsystems).
apprehensively
Henkin,supranote 10,at 1565;seealsoIn rePaquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700
law is partof our law,and mustbe ascertainedand adminis(1900) ("International
teredbythe courts... as oftenas questionsof rightdependingupon it are dulypresentedfortheirdetermination.").
U.S. CONST. art.VI, ? 1, cl. 2 ("This Constitution,
and the Lawsof the United
Stateswhichshallbe made in Pursuancethereof;and all Treatiesmade,or whichshall
be made, undertheAuthority
of the UnitedStates,shallbe the supremeLaw of the
Land.
1See,

e.g., (reene

523 U.S. at 374 (denying certiorariand motion forstayof execu-

tionin spiteof an InternationalcourtofJusticeopiniongranting
a provisionalorder
in a case alleginga violationof theVienna Conventionon ConsularRelations);Federal RepublicofGermany
v. UnitedStates,526 U.S. 111,111-12(1999) (same); Thompson,487 U.S. at 869 n.4 (Scalia,J.,dissenting)(arguingthatlawsofothernationshave
littlerelevanceto interpreting
EighthAmendmentstandardsof cruel and unusual
in thecontextofexecutionsoffifteen-year-olds,
punishment
statingthat"itis a Constitutionforthe UnitedStatesofAmericathatwe are expounding");seealsoStanfordv.
Kentucky,
492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989) (Scalia,J.) (rejectingthe relevanceof thelaw
of othernationsin interpreting
the EighthAmendmentin a juveniledeath penalty
case involving
sixteen-and seventeen-year-olds
and statingthat"[w]e emphasizethatit
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treatiesand customary
international
law are "our law,"52some membersof the SupremeCourtviewinternational
humanrightslaw as an
offshorebody of law-an alien set of normsthatexistsout "6there,"
overseas,but havelittlerelevance"here,"in the UnitedStates.53Missing fromthisapproach is recognitionof how internationallaw got
"there,"as wellas theroleAmericansplayedin puttingit "there."54
A furtherconstraintin thejudicial contextis the factthat the
UnitedStateshas neitherratifiedseveralof the major human rights
5 nor fullyimplementedtreatiesthatit has ratified.Having
treaties,
declared most human rights treatiesit ratifiesto be non-selfof these
executing,the United Stateshas limitedthe enforceability
treatiesabsentimplementing
legislation.: Bynotenactingimplemenis American
conceptionsofdecencythatare dispositive").
52
PaqueteHabana, 175 U.S. at 700.
5
to
SeeKnop,supranote 21, at 522-23(usingthe "here"and "there"distinction
law); seealso
demonstrate
the perceiveddistancebetweennationaland international
LOUIS HENKIN,THE AGE OF RIGHTS 157-78 (1989) (using the "here" and "there" dis-

tinctionto demonstrate
theperceiveddistancebetweenU.S. law and thelawof other
countries). Compare
supranote 47 (citingcases in whichSupremeCourtJusticesrecclaims),
ognizedthe relevanceof international
law to interpreting
U.S. constitutional
withsupranote51 (citingcasesin whichSupremeCourtJustices
failedto recognizethe
relevanceofinternational
lawin interpreting
U.S. constitutional
claims).
54 For discussions
of the role Americansplayedin developingand sustainingthe
internationalhuman rightsframework,see MARYANNGLENDON,A WORLD MADE NEW:
ELEANORROOSEVELTAND THE UNIVERSALDECLARATIONOF HUMAN RIGHTS (2001);

and PresidentRoosevelt's"Four Freedoms"speech, FranklinD. Roosevelt,Annual
Message to Congress (Jan. 6, 1941), in 9 THE PUBLIC PAPERSAND ADDRESSES OF

FRANKLIN
D. ROOSEVELT,
1940,at 663 (1941), whichpaved the wayforcriticalconsupranote53, at
ceptsin theUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights.SeealsoHENKIN,
can proudlyclaim an importantpartin the devel156 ("Americanconstitutionalism
and in theirdissemination
humanrights,
to everycontinent
opmentof international
and corner."); Oscar Schacter, InternationalLaw Implicationsof U.S. Human RightsPoli-

cies,24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 63, 66-69 (1978) (discussinghow the UnitedStateshas
legal obligations
givenimpetusto recognitionof core humanrightsas international
evenin theabsenceofhumanrightstreaties).
For example, the United States has signed but not ratified,inter alia, CEDAW,
supra note 3; Convention on the Rightsof the Child, openedforsignatureNov. 20, 1989,
1577 U.N.T.S. 44; and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights,openedforsignatureDec. 16, 1966, S. EXEC. Doc. D, 95-2, at 13, 993 U.N.T.S. 4.

declarations
Debates regardingthe validityand impactof non-self-executing

remain.
Compare LOuIs HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION201-02 (2d ed. 1996) (arguing that the use of non-self-executingdeclarations is "'anti-Constitutional'in spirit and highly problematic as a matter of law"),
and "NonLori F. Damrosch, TheRole oftheUnitedStatesSenateConcerning"Self-Executing"
Self-Executing"
Treaties,67 CHI.-KENTL. REv. 515, 532 (1991) (questioning whethernonself-executingdeclarations have either domestic or internationaleffect),Martin S. Flaand Treatiesas "Suherty,HistoryRight?: HistoricalScholarship,Original Understanding,
premeLaw oftheLand", 99 COLUM. L. REv. 2095, 2097-99 (1999) (supporting the doc-

2001]

DIALOGIC hDPEORALISM

259

tating legislation where existingmeasures are absent and by not taking other steps to achieve the substantiverightsin ratifiedtreaties,the
United States fails to follow throughon internationalobligations that
require treatysignatories to implement these instrumentsthrough
legislationand other measures.57
The reluctance and open hostilitysome federal courts express toward international law claims reflect ambivalence toward the legitimacy of internationallaw as a source of law. While expert organizations such as Amnestyand Human RightsWatch (along with a small
handful of law school-based human rightsclinics) file amicus briefs
introducingcourts to these claims, most courts refuseto view international law claims as relevant to the resolution of specific cases. Because internationallaw is not claimed by the American people as "our
law," some judges argue that we can legitimatelyignore it. By contrast,ifAmericans adopted internationalstandards as theirstandards,
then an analysisof internationallaw would indeed be relevant to determining,for example, "evolvingstandards of decency" in the context of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment.i8While adoption of internationallaw as "our law" rarely

trineof self-executing
declarationsin responsetoJohnYoo), and CarlosManuelVazquez, TheFourDoctrines
ofSelfExecuting
Treaties,
89 AM.J. INT'L. L. 695, 700-22(1995)
(identifying
fourlegitimate
reasonsforconcludingthata treaty
is non-self-executing),
withJohn C. Yoo, Globalismand the Constitution: Treaties,Non-Self-Execution,
and the
99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1961-62(1999) [hereinafter
Yoo,
Original Understanding,

Globalism
and theConstitution]
(challengingtheviewthatthe Foundersintendedtrea-

ties to be self-executing),andJohn C. Yoo, Treatiesand PublicLawmaking: A Textualand
StructuralDefense of Non-Self-Execution,
99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218, 2221-33 (1999)

[hereinafter
Yoo, Treaties
and PublicLawmaking]
(replyingto Flaherty'sresponseto
Yoo's earlierarticledefendingnon-self-execution).
5
See,e.g.,ICCPR, supranote5, at art.2, para. 2, S. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2,at 24,999
U.N.T.S.at 173-74("[E]ach StatePartyto thepresentCovenantundertakes
to takethe
necessary
steps,in accordancewithitsconstitutional
processesand withtheprovisions
of thepresentCovenant,to adopt suchlegislative
or othermeasuresas maybe necesto therightsrecognizedin thepresentCovenant.");id.at art.2, para.
saryto giveeffect
3, S. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2,at 24, 999 U.N.T.S.at 173-74("Each StatePartyto thepresent
Covenantundertakes: (a) To ensure thatany personwhose rightsor freedomsas
hereinrecognizedare violatedshall have an effective
remedy...."); seealsoConventionAgainstTortureand OtherCruel,Inhumanor DegradingTreatmentor Punishment,opened
forsignature
Dec. 10, 1984,arts.4-5,S. TREAy Doc. No. 100-20,at 20,
1465 U.N.T.S. 113, 114 (usingsimilarlanguage,but includingrequirement
thateach
StateParty"ensurethatall actsoftorture
are offences
underitscriminallaw").
Stanfordv. Kentucky,
492 U.S. 361, 369 & n.1 (1989) (Scalia,J.) (findCompare
ing thatthe laws of other nationshave littlerelevanceto interpreting
the Eighth
Amendmentprohibitionon crueland unusualpunishmentin the contextof executionsof people whoweresixteenor seventeenyearsold at the timeof theoffensebecause "it is American
conceptionsof decencythatare dispositive"),
withThompsonv.
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occurs in federal courtrooms, outside the courtroom international
human rightslaw is increasinglyshaping debates at the state and local
levels in the contextof the death penalty.
In the legislativeand executive branches of government,the current practice of adopting treatiesinvolveswhat I call a "black box" approach whose reliance on technical expertise in human rightsallows,
at best, modest engagement by members of the citizenrybeyond
Washington-based,inside-the-beltway
nongovernmentalorganizations
(NGOs).5
By short-circuitingbroad-based deliberation, this "black
box" approach allows "transmittalof the international," not a full
"process of translationfrom international to national.""" Because of
the federal government'sfailure to engage in this process of translation-in its neglect of internationallaw as eitheran interpretivetool or
as binding law-most Americans see internationalhuman rightslaw as
an irrelevantoffshorebody of law.i' This Article argues that a more
complete drawing down of international law depends on the development of more participatorymechanisms throughwhich Americans
can fostera deeper human rightsculture.62 By cultivatingand amplifyingthe voices of state and local governmentsin the adoption and
implementation of human rights,dialogic federalismassistsin widening the base of support for and increasing the legitimacyof these

Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 (1988) (Stevens,J.) (findingthat the laws of other nations wererelevant in interpretingthe Eighth Amendment in a case concerning the
execution of a person who was fifteenyears old at the time the offensewas committed).
Polyarchy:An Insti9Cf Oliver Gerstenberg& Charles F. Sabel, Directly-Deliberative
tutionalIdeal forEurope?,at 2, at http://www.law.columbia.edu/sabel/papers.htm(last
visited Nov. 26, 2001) (discussing how a similar dynamic is at work in the European
Union, where "the sheer complexity [of the emerging system] and especially its reliance on technocratic deliberation, renders implausible even the most modest assumption of effectivepolitical oversightby an informedcitizenry").
Knop, supranote 21, at 505 (emphasis added).
in theUnitedStates: An InterfCfDorothy Q. Thomas, AdvancingRightsProtection
9 HARV. HUM. RTS.J. 15, 19 (1996) (describing evidence
nationalizedAdvocacyStrategy,
that "domestic rightsgroups in the United States have become less, rather than more,
internationalized in their advocacy approach," and attributingthis to "the U.S. government's longstanding determination to insulate the national legal systemfrom the
influence of internationallaw").
to interKaren Knop refersto this sentiment as Volkerrechtsfreundlich-"friendly
national law." Knop, supra note 21, at 502 (using this term loosely and citing,for the
more technical meaning, Brunno Simma et al., TheRole ofGermanCourtsin theJnJbrcementof InternationalHuman Rights,in ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
DOMESTIC COURTS 71, 94-96 (Benedetto Conforti& Francesco Francioni eds., 1997)).
Of course, there is a chicken-and-eggproblem here in that dialogic federalism both
creates and requires a deeper human rightsculture.
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(33

norms.
Rather than mobilize support for meaningfulratificationof these
treatiesby convincing the public that treatycommitmentswill make a
differencein theirlives,the Washington-basedNGO insiders reassure
lawmakersthat adoption of human rightstreatieswill not fundamentallydisturb existingdomestic law commitments. These reassurances
in that lawmakers attach a range of conditions
become self-fulfilling
known as reservations,understandings,and declarations (RUDs) to
treatiesto ensure that their impact is limited.4 RUDs, in turn,reinforce the lack of domestic constituentsupport for treatiesadopted by
stealth within the black box, since there appears to be little value
added. However, without such conditions attached, human rights
treatiescould dramaticallyexpand protectionsfor disenfranchisedindividuals.'

These stealth treaties slip silently into law, encumbered

with RUDs that water down their domestic impact. Not surprisingly,
the perception that followsis that these treatiesare ineffective,dead
letters of the law, ensuring continued apathy for the human rights
norms thatthese treatiesconvey.

Of course, broadening participation in the deliberation and implementation of
human rightslaw does not necessarilyensure that the public will accept these norms.
Afterall, knowledge does not equal acceptance. However, thisArticle argues that it is
betterto have fewerinternationalhuman rightsnorms incorporated into domestic law
that enjoy broader support and legitimacy than to have many international norms
formallyincorporated thatlack de facto legitimacy.
These RUDs frequentlyinclude, for example, a boiler-plate declaration proas described above. For furtherdiscussion
nouncing thata treatyis non-self-executing,
of RUDs, see Louis Henkin, U.S. RatificationcfHuman RightsConventions:The Ghostof
SenatorBricker,
89 AM.J. INT'L L. 341, 349 (1995), explaining thatU.S. RUDs upholding
federalistideals limit the impact of treatiesand agreements; and Curtis A. Bradley &
Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties,Human Rights,and ConditionalConsent,149 U. PA. L. REV.
399, 419 (2000), explaining that non-self-executing"declarations are designed to preclude the treatiesfrombeing enforceable in U.S. courts in the absence of implementing legislation."
Even withRUDs, including non-self-executingdeclarations, treatiesmay provide
some value. See Martha F. Davis, InternationalHuman Rightsand UnitedStatesLaw:
Predictionsof a Courtwatcher,
64 ALB. L. REV. 417, 428-36 (2000) (demonstrating the
value of international human rightslaw as interpretivetool); Connie de la Vega, Civil
RightsDuring the1990s: New TreatyLaw Could Help Immensely,
65 U. CIN. L. REV. 423,
467-70 (1997) (proposing that governmententitiescan use non-self-executingtreaties
to defend programs thatprotect or promote the human rightsgoals of the treaties); see
also Murrayv. Schooner Charming Betsy,6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (offeringa
canon of statutoryconstructionthat directs that "an act of [C]ongress ought never to
be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible constructionremains");
Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of InternationalLaw as a Canon of DomesticStatutory
43 VAND. L. REV. 1103 (1990) (suggesting ways to use the CharmingBetsy
Construction,
principle as an interpretivetool).

262

UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIALAWREVIEW

[Vol. 150: 245

model may arScholars who follow the revisionist/fragmentation
gue that RUDs represent resistance by domestic constituencies to effortsby internationalelites thatwould disruptlocal practices,and that
in this sense, RUDs reflectdemocracy at work. In fact, this is what
Senator Brickerand other segregationistsargued forin tryingto limit
the reach of the treatypower in the 1950s.'ifHowever, there is no evidence today that RUDs mark an attempt to preserve local practices.
Because ratificationoccurs withthe advice and consent of the Senate,
and not the House, it is hard to argue that RUDs trulyreflectlocal
practices.
Rather, the adoption and compliance of human rightstreatiesby
stealth paves the way for limited and cramped incorporation of international protectionswithconditions thatrestrictthe reach of these instruments. Stealth treaties are also troubling because they result in
the average person on the streethaving littleto no knowledge of the
international human rights protections to which she is entitled.
Clearly there is a paradox if the only way to ensure that the executive
branch and Senate adopt treatiesis by stealth,which in turn ensures
dead lettersof the law.
thattreatiesare ineffective,
II. DIALOGIcFEDERALISM
To move beyond these challenges, this Article proposes dialogic
federalismas a possible solution. Rather than embrace zero-sum understandingsof the respectiveroles of federal and nonfederal systems,
a dialogic approach depends on cooperation between these systemsto
translate broad international law principles into concrete domestic
laws and policies. Borrowing insights from both the revisionist/fragmentation and traditional/hierarchical models described
above, dialogic federalism seeks to both (1) deepen the democratic
legitimacyof internationalhuman rightslaws through state and local
innovation in implementingthese laws, and (2) broaden formsof national coordination of thisinnovation.
Achievingthese twingoals involvesbridgingthe twovisions of the
Constitutionalluded to above:67 its commitmentto complex divisions
of powers (in accord with its Madisonian inspiration) on the one
hand, and its stake in national institutionsdesigned to address the in-

See NATALIE HEVENER KAUFMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE SENATE: A
HISTORY OF OPPOSITION 99-100, 108-10(1990) (describinghow the BrickerAmend-

ratification).
mentwouldhaveprotectedstates'rightsin thecontextoftreaty
text.
Supra notes29-32and accompanying
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abilityof the Continental Congress to give effectto the law of nations
under the Articlesof Confederation, on the other hand. The latter
vision was bolstered by federal initiativesof the New Deal and civil
rightseras. By arguing for ways to affordcitizens and other actors
greaterparticipationin using local knowledgeto craftsolutions thatfit
democratic exthe particular circumstances of their communities,8iS
perimentalistshave tried to theorize new formsof governance that accommodate the essence of these two visions. The tension between
these two visions is reflectedin the society's erraticjurisprudence on
federalism, which prohibits Congress from commandeering states
even while it permits Congress to deeply influence state lawmaking
through constitutional spending powers and conditional preemption.'1 Democratic experimentalistspropose to resolve this dilemma
by enabling state and local governmentsto partner with (rather than
replace) federal governmentin more meaningfulwaysby facilitating
more participatoryand democratic modes of lawmaking.
Similarly,dialogic federalism envisions intergovernmentalcooperation and dialogue as a means of addressing this constitutionalconundrum and democratizingthe implementationof human rightslaw
in the United States. This approach "reinterpretsdemocratic deliberation to advance the Madisonian project of using the institutionsof
governmentitselfto fosterpractical cooperation."70 It is in this spirit
that a dialogic approach is offered"not as an alternativeto the American constitutionaltraditionbut as an interpretationof it."7' As an interpretationof this tradition,dialogic federalism acknowledges the
federal government's foreign affairsrole provided under the U.S.
Constitutionand anticipated by internationallaw.72 This model also
recognizes the riskof "multiplevariantsof the same internationallaw
rule"73 that the establishmentof a nationalconstitutionwas designed
to avoid.
However, the rationale behind the need for the nation to speak

See,e.g.,Dorf& Sabel, supranote 29, at 314, 316-23(presentingthe basic featuresofa "subnational,
pragmatist
government").
Seeid.at 419-28("[T]he SupremeCourtoscillates... betweenrevisionary
revivals of thedistinction
[betweenfederaland statepowers]and wearycriticism
of therevision.").
7
Id. at 289.
71

2

Id.

Seesupranotes43-44and accompanying
text(describingauthority
forthe federal government'srole under the U.S. Constitutionand international
law, respec.
tively)
73 Koh,supra
note 10,at 1832.
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with "one voice" through the President with respect to other countries-that is, to avoid sending contradictorysignals regardingU.S. relations with other countries-loses its bite in the context of domestic
incorporation of internationalhuman rightslaw.74 In the foreign affairscontext,contradictorysignals may be sent if,for example, a state
or local governmentimposes sanctions on a foreign countrythat are
v.
inconsistentwithfederal policy towardthatcountry. Thus, in Crosby
NationalForeignTrade Council,the Supreme Court held that a Massachusettssanctions law regardingBurma was preempted by federal legislation directing the President to develop "a comprehensive, multilateral strategyto bring democracy to and improve human rights
practices and the qualityof life in Burma."'7 In the context of domestic incorporation of internationalhuman rightslaw, the risk of sending contradictingsignals in U.S. relations with other countries is significantlyless. Yet, a subnational approach to domestic incorporation
of human rightsmay lead to the development of "divergentand per7
of international standards,
haps parochial state interpretations"
which the Founders sought to avoid.77Moreover,since the parameters
there is an outside
of foreign and domestic are often intermingled,78
chance that such pronouncements could affect U.S. relations with
other countries in ways that would obscure "the President's power to
with other nations."79 A possible way to
speak and bargain effectively

For a classic statement of the rationale behind the "one-voice" principle, see
Crosbyv. NationalForeignTrade Council,530 U.S. 363, 381 (2000), stating,"[t]he President's maximum power to persuade [in foreignaffairs]restson his capacity to bargain
for the benefits of access to the entire national economy without exception for enby inconsistentpolitical tactics." Id.
claves fenced offwilly-nilly
7
Id. at 369 (quoting Omnibus Consolidated AppropriationsAct, Pub. L. No. 104208, ? 570(c), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-166 (1997)).
7 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964).
7See supra note 42 (discussing the Founders' opinions about American foreign
polic)

polC)f INDERPAL GREWAL & CAREN KAPLAN, INTRODUCTION TO SCATTERED
FEMINISTPRACTICES10-13 (InHEGEMONIES: POSTMODERNITYAND TRANSNATIONAL
derpal Grewal & Caren Kaplan eds., 1994) (discussing blurring of the line between
global and local).
530 U.S. at 382. For example, a state government's narrow interpretaCrosby,
tion of the scope of internationallaw obligations in the death penalty context can implicate and has implicated the nation's relations with other countries. See,e.g., LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. No. 104 (June 27) (holding thatArizona failed
to notifytwo German nationals facing the death penalty of their rightsunder the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, which requires notifyingan arrested or detained foreignnational of his rightto consult witha consular official,in a case brought
by Germany against the United States to challenge the death sentences), available at
Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
http://www.icj-cji.org;
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limitthisriskis by preemptingstate and local governmentattemptsto
convert their incorporation of international human rightslaws into
pronouncements of international law. Under this approach these
state and local enactmentswould operate as nothing more than state
and local law, adopted pursuant to authoritythat clearly exists at the
subnational level.
In fact,enabling state and local governmentsto partner with the
federal governmentin incorporationof human rightslaw may convert
weakly-legitimatednorms developed at the international level into
norms that are more stronglylegitimatedat a local level. By bringing
human rights lawmaking closer to the people whose rights are affected,a dialogic federalistapproach has the added benefitof democratizing the implementation of international law norms. Furthermore, incentivizingstate and local governmentsto experiment with
the direct incorporation of human rightslaw would address, to a large
extent, the federalismconcerns raised in the context of federalincorporation of norms perceived as fallingwithinareas traditionallyrelegated to statessuch as familylaw and criminallaw."
These federalism concerns are raised even though, according to
the Supreme Court in Missouriv. Holland,the treatypower authorizes
Congress to legislate under the Necessaryand Proper Clause"' in areas
beyond those specificallyconferredon Congress byArticleI, Section 8
of the Constitution,and the treatypower is not subject to most Tenth
Amendment limitations.82The proposed BrickerAmendment in the
1950s would have formallylimited the treatypower to the extent it ex-

(Para.v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J.No. 99 (Nov. 10) (holdingthatbecause thestateofVirginia
failedto notify
a Paraguayannationalfacingthedeathpenaltyofhis rightto consulta
consularofficial,
theUnitedStatesviolatedtheViennaConventionon ConsularRelations,in a case broughtbyParaguayagainsttheUnitedStatesto challengethe death
sentence),availableathttp://www.icj-cji.org.
But seeDorf & Sabel, supranote 29, at 419-28 (suggestingthatthe Supreme
Court'sjurisprudenceon federalism
is misguided);Resnik,supranote 17 (manuscript
at 3) (arguingthatwe need to be less categoricalabout whatwe viewas "trulylocal"
and "trulynational"); Reva Siegel, She,thePeople: TheNineteenth
SexEquality,
Amendment,

Federalism,
and theFamily,
115 HARv.L. REV. (forthcoming
2002) (arguingthatthe
NineteenthAmendmentcould be read as subverting
traditionalunderstandings
of
women'srolesin thefamily,
genderequality,and federalism).
family,
U.S. CONST. art. I, ? 8, cl. 18.
252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920) ("No doubtthegreatbodyofprivaterelationsusually
fallwithinthecontrolof [a] [s]tate,buta treaty
mayoverrideitspower."). WhileMissouriv. Hollandholds thatmostTenthAmendmentlimitations
do not applyto the
treaty
power,itis lessclearwhethertheanticommandeering
doctrine,whichprohibits
Congress from conscriptingstate legislators or officersto enforce federal law, applies
to the treatypower.
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tends congressional authoritybeyond the constraintsof federalism.
Despite the 1954 defeat of the BrickerAmendment,the currentpractice by the Senate and executive branch of attaching federalismunderstandings8'and other conditions to treatiesduring the ratification
process achieves the same result.85 Arguably,a federalismunderstanding "'serve[s] no legal purpose,"' because "such a declaration of intent
does not decrease the United States' international obligations and
does not decrease in the slightestthe power of Congress to implement
those obligations."86 However, in light of the Supreme Court's new
3See KAUFMAN, supranote 66, at 99-100,108-10 (describinghow the Bricker
ratification).
wouldhaveprotectedstates'rightsin thecontextoftreaty
Amendment
Forexample,see theU.S. RUDs to theICCPR:
thatthisCovenantshallbe implemented
That the UnitedStatesunderstands
andjudito theextentthatit exerciseslegislative
bytheFederalGovernment
cialjurisdictionoverthe matterscoveredtherein,and otherwiseby the state
exerto the extentthatstateand local governments
and local governments;
shall takemeasthe FederalGovernment
cisejurisdictionoversuch matters,
to theend thatthecompetentauthoriuresappropriateto theFederalsystem
maytakeappropriatemeasuresforthe
tiesof the stateor local governments
oftheCovenant.
fullfulfillment
U.S. RUDs to theICCPR,supranote5, at 8071.
ProfessorGeraldNeuman observes,"The legislativehistoryexplainsthatan unwasemployed,because 'theintentis not to modratherthana reservation
derstanding
underthe Covenantbut ratherto put our futuretreaty
ifyor limitU.S. undertakings
of our federalsystemconcerning
partnerson noticewithregardto the implications
implementation."'Gerald L. Neuman, The GlobalDimensionof RFRA,14 CONST.
COMMENT.33, 51-52(1997) (quotingS. EXEC.REP. No. 102-23,at 18 (1992) (reprintexplanation)).
ingtheGeorgeH.W.Bushadministration's
of
representsa fairlyexplicitdemonstration
While a federalismunderstanding
concerns,a moreimplicitwaytheU.S. expressestheseconcernsis byenterfederalism
fallswithin
on a treaty
provisionconcerninga rightthattraditionally
ing a reservation
theambitof stateregulation.See, e.g., U.S. RUDs to the ICCPR, supranote 5, at 8070
on theprovisionprohibiting
thejuveniledeathpenalty).
a U.S. reservation
(providing

See DUANE TANANBAUM, THE BRICKER AMENDMENT CONTROVERSY: A TEST OF
EISENHOWER'SPOLITIcAL LEADERSHIP89 (1988) (discussingEisenhower'spromiseto
85

exercise treaty-making
power only within"traditionallimits,"consistentwith the
BrickerAmendment);Henkin,supranote 64, at 349 (explainingthatthe Senate and
executivebranch'scurrentpracticeof attachingRUDs to treatiesachievesthe goal
SenatorBrickersought).
Neuman,supranote 84, at 52 (quotingHenkin,supranote 64, at 346). Note
thatProfessorNeumanis makingtwodistinctpointshere regardingthe impactof a
and theotherdomestic.The firstpoint
understanding:one international
federalism
whilethesecond
obligations,
concernstheimpacton theUnitedStates'international
to implementthoseobligations.On the
concernstheimpacton itsdomesticauthority
conclusion. See Spiro,supranote
domesticpoint,Professor
Spirocomesto a different
a formalinstitutional
constitute
understandings
17,at 576-77(arguingthat"federalism
oflaw"). Professor
Spironotes:
statement
Indeed, the patternof a defeatedamendmentfollowedbya practiceconsistentwiththe amendment'ssubstancebearssome resemblanceto BruceAck-
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federalismjurisprudence,87 Congress may be hesitant to regulate conduct deemed to be quintessentiallylocal in nature (such as criminal
and familylaw).88 At the veryleast, at the domestic level, a federalism
understandingrepresentsa political gesture to reassure state and local
governmentsthat the federal governmentwill not use the treatyin
question to disturb existingdivisions of power between national and
subnational units.9 At the internationallevel, the United States often
points to deference to states' rightsas the reason whyit cannot meet
international human rights requirements.:" In fact, it is not clear
whether the federal governmentcan impose these requirements on
state and local governmentsthrough federal directiveswithoutviolating the anti-commandeeringdoctrine, which prohibits the federal
governmentfromissuingsuch directives.' Thus, supportingstate and
local governmentsto participate in domestic implementation of hu-

erman'sand David Golove'sdescriptionof how the congressional-executive
agreementcame to win constitutional
legitimacyoutside of the ArticleII
treatyprocess.... In bothepisodes,proposedamendments
weredefeatedin
partbecauseofinformal
institutional
agreementto respecttheirsubstance.
Id. at 576 n.32 (citingBruceAckerman& David Golove,Is NaftaConstitutional?,
108
HARv.L. REv. 799 (1995)). On the international
point,Spiro agreeswithNeuman
thatfederalism
understandings
lack international
effect.Id. at 577; seealsoICCPR, supranote5, at art.50, S. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2,at 38, 999 U.N.T.S.at 185,whichappliesto
"allpartsoffederalStateswithoutanylimitations
or exceptions."
See,e.g.,Printzv. UnitedStates,521 U.S. 898,935 (1997) (holdingthatthefederal government
maynotcompelthestates"toadminister
or enforcea federalregulatoryprogram");U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 549 (1995) (findingthata federalgun
controllawbanningfirearmpossessionin local schoolzones exceedsCongress'CommerceClause power);NewYorkv. UnitedStates,505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (holding
thatCongressmaynotcommandeerthestates'legislative
processesbydirectly
compellingstatesto enactand enforcea federalregulatory
program). ButseeBushv. Gore,
531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (reversing
theFloridaSupremeCourton an issueofstatelaw).
SeeUnitedStatesv. Morrison,529 U.S. 598, 598-99(2000) (striking
down the
"civilrightsremedy"provisionin theViolenceAgainstWomenActas unconstitutional,
holdingthatCongresslacked the authority
to regulatethe spherereservedforthe
states). For a critiqueof theSupremeCourt'sdecisionin United
Statesv. Morrison,
see
Resnik,supranote 17.
9
Neuman,supranote 84, at 52-53 ("The federalismunderstanding
does, however,signalthepoliticalrealitythatsome membersof Congressare reluctantto exercise existingfederalpower [to enforcetreaties]in areas of traditionalstateregulation.").
See,e.g.,U.N. GAOR,Hum. Rts.Comm.,53rdSess.,1405thmtg.11 12-13,U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1405(1995) ("[T]he decision to retain [the death penalty]reflecteda seriousand considereddemocraticchoice of theAmericanpublic.... [The
juveniledeathpenaltywas retainedbecause a] largemajority
of statespermitted
juvenilesto be triedas adultsin gravecasesinvolving
capitaloffences
at. . . 16 or 17.")
!
Seesupranotes82, 87 (explaininganticommandeering
doctrineand cases,respectively).
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man rightswould clear the way for compliance at the federal level, as
state and local noncompliance would no longer justifyfederal noncompliance based on federalismconcerns.
Facilitatingstate and local involvementin implementing human
rightsstandards may also address democratic deficitsinherent in the
making and implementationof internationallaw at the national level.
Because the international systemis a systemof states, national governments-not individuals-participate in the development and
adoption of internationalnorms. While NGOs are increasinglygainarenas and other fora where important
ing a voice in treaty-making
internationallaw decisions are made, access to these decision-making
processes is oftenmediated by elaborate credential requirementsthat
limitparticipation.2
Additionally,as discussed above, the general public is disengaged
fromthe primaryprocesses throughwhich human rightslaw is incorporated at the national level. As the work of democratic experimentalistsand other scholars suggests,similar democratic deficitsare reflectedin the formationof domestic legislation in the United States,
as well as in other contexts including the European Union.:4 The
process is a factor
omission of the House from the treaty-ratification
that may undermine furtherthe democratic legitimacy of international human rightstreatylaw. Subnational,participationin incorporatinghuman rightslaws strengthensdemocratic deliberation of these
laws.
Participation by subnational governmentsand NGOs in incorporating human rightslaw can usefullybe considered in the context of

98 MICH. L. REv. 167,
Cf Eyal Benvenisti,Exit and Voicein theAge ofGlobalization,
170, 202-11 (1999) (proposing a theoryof transnational institutionsthat could offer
"more effectiveopportunities for democratic participation in national and transnational decision making").
9
See, e.g., MASHAW,supra note 28, at 100-01 (highlighting an interpretationof
public choice analysisof legislativeorganization in which committee members who are
unrepresentativeof the Congress as a whole, and thus likelyunrepresentativeof the
people as a whole, dominate the legislative process); Dorf & Sabel, supra note 29, at
270-92 (proposing as a solution "democratic experimentalism"which combines federal
learning with the protection of the federatedjurisdictions and the rightsof individuals); Tushnet, supra note 38, at 1069-71 (discussing the democratic deficitinherent in
national politics in the U.S. and suggestingthat general cultural transformation,rather
than the revivalof constitutionalfederalism,may be the way to eliminate such a deficit).
4 See Gerstenberg & Sabel, supra note 59, at 2-5 (noting that the complexity of
multilevel governance in the European Union "renders implausible even the most
modest assumption of effectivepolitical oversightby an informedcitizenry").
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95 the permeability of national
the "disaggregation" of sovereignty,
borders,and the ascendancy of a transnationalcivilsociety. Interestingly,the theorythat the State is disaggregatingconcludes that the
formationof transnationalnetworksbetween and among government
convergence
bureaucratsand judges withinthese States leads to greater
and harmonization,not less.: Conceivably, intonational networksof
NGOs and/or state and local governmentsmay lead to a similar convergence of norms.: At the same time, these local enactmentsmight
be read as facilitatingpublic policy experimentation. More diffuse
modes of implementinghuman rightslaw at various levels of government are consistentwith what other scholars have described as the

SeeAnne-Marie Slaughter, InternationalLaw in a WorldofLiberalStates,6 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 503, 505, 537 (1995) [hereinafterSlaughter, International
Law] (envisioning "a

world of liberal States," in which the State and sovereigntyare disaggregated into
"component political institutions"); see also SASKIASASSEN,GLOBALIZATIONAND ITS
DISCONTENTS 92 (1998) ("[T]here is an unbundling of sovereignty[:]... the relocation of various components of sovereigntyonto supranational, nongovernmental, or
private institutions.");Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New WorldOrder,FOREIGNAFF.,
Sept./Oct. 1997, at 183, 184 ("The [S]tate is not disappearing, it is disaggregatinginto
its separate, functionallydistinctparts. These parts ... are networkingwith theircounterpartsabroad, creating a dense web of relations that constitutesa new, transgovernmental order."); Peter J. Spiro, ForeignRelationsFederalism,70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1223
(1999) (extending Professor Slaughter's disaggregation thesis to include disaggregation of federal and subfederal actors).
96SeeTadashi Yamamoto & Jessica T. Mathews, Forewordto THE THIRD FORCE:
THE RISE OF TRANSNATIONAL
CIVIL SOCIETY, at vi (Ann M. Florini ed., 2000) (arguing
that the "border-spanning networks"that comprise transnational civil society "are a
century"); see
real and enduring force in the international relations of the twenty-first
also ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
REGuLAToRYAGREEMENTs
27 (1995) ("[E]ven [the
COMPLIANCEWITHINTERNATIONAL
largest and most powerfulStates] cannot achieve their principal purposes ... without
the help and cooperation of many other participantsin the system,including entities
that are not [S]tates at all."); MARGARETE. KECK & KATHRYNSIKKINK,ACTIVISTS
POLITICS 3-5 (1998) (deBEYONDBORDERS: Ai)VO(A(CYNETWORKSIN INTERNATIONAL
scribing transuational advocacy networksas communication structuresthat use information strategically"[t]o influence discourse, procedures, and policy" on an international scale); Benvenisti, supra note 92, at 169 (advocating a "transnational conflict
paradigm" that "shows how domestic interest groups often cooperate with similarly
situated foreigninterest groups in order to impose externalities on rival domestic
groups"); Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 FrankelLecture: BringingInternationalLaw
Home,35 HOuS. L. REV. 623, 647-48 (1998) (describing the role of transnationalnorm
entrepreneurs, i.e., those who assist States to internalize norms in the transnational
legal process).
9SeeSlaughter, International
Law, supra note 95, at 512-13 (discussing the correlation between a high level of transnational networksand a convergence in the reluctance to use force among liberal democracies).
(See Spiro, sufpranote 95, at 1267 ("Retaliation at the international level is increasinglygoverned by norms ratherthan merelyby interests,and indeed is now being
undertaken by a varietyof actors beyond nation-states.").
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emergence and utilization of norm entrepreneurs, who develop
transnationalnetworksas communication structuresthat use information strategically.99
At the same time, drawingon the work of democratic experimentalists,"'?thisArticleargues that the federal governmenthas an important role to play in coordinating and extractingworkable norms from
the various local initiatives. There is precedent for the federal government coordinating and encouraging participationof state and local governmentsin internationallawmakingin the trade area, which
could provide a possible model.101To avoid the problem of "divergent
and perhaps parochial state interpretations of the same international law rule, the federal governmentor other national entitymust
99

SeeKECK & SIKKINK, supra note 96, at 16, 18-22 (highlightingthe abilityof transnational advocacy networks"to quickly and credibly generate politicallyusable information and move it to where it will have the most impact"); see also Benvenisti, supra
note 92, at 202-03 (discussing the abilityof transnational institutionsto reduce informational asymmetriesby, inter alia, "monitoring compliance of the various domestic
actors" with institutionalpolicies and by "providing access and soliciting input from
NGOs representinga varietyof interestgroups").
MSee,
e.g.,Dorf & Sabel, supranote 29, at 288 (calling "the overall systemof public problem solving that combines federal learning with the protection of the interests
experimentalism");
of the federatedjurisdictions and the rightsof individuals democratic
Competition,
and SancArchon Fung et al., RealizingLabor Standards: How Transparency,
BOSTON REv., Feb./Mar. 2001, at
tions Could ImproveWorkingConditionsWorldwide,
(proposing a strategyfor strengthenhttp://bostonreview.mit.edu/BR26.1/fung.html
ing labor standards thatwould use monitoringand public disclosure of workingconditions to create firm-levelincentives for improvement); Brad Karkkainen et al., After
RegulaBased RegimeofEnvironmental
BackyardEnvironmentalism:Towarda Performance
combines the virexperimentalism
tion,44 AM. BEHAV.SCIENTIST690, 690 (" [D] emocratic
tues of localism, decentralization,and direct citizen participationwiththe discipline of
national coordination, transparency,and public accountability." (citation omitted));
Susan Sturm, Second GenerationEmployment
Discrimination:A StructuralApproach,101
COLUM. L. REv. 458, 462-63 (2001) (exploring the potential for a regulatoryapproach
in which "normative elaboration occurs through a fluid, interactiverelationship between problem solving and problem definitionwithinspecificworkplaces and in multiple other arenas, including but not limited to thejudiciary").
1
SeeGeorge Bermann, Federalism and the Enforceabilityof United States Treaty
Obligations 59 (Jan. 21, 1999) (unpublished manuscript,on filewithauthor). For example, the federal governmentcreated an IntergovernmentalPolicy AdvisoryCommittee (IGPAC) to provide subnational governmentalinput into internationaltrade negotiations in response to the requirement under the 1974 Trade Act that the President
seek advice from the "non-federal" government sector. Id. Approximately thirtyto
fortystate and local government officials,including governors, participate in the
IGPAC. Id. at 59 n.172. Additionally,because state and local governmentsdemanded
similar assurances in the statutes implementing NAFTA and the Uruguay Round
Agreements,in both instances the legislation creates a process of consultation for subnational governments. Id. at 59.
102
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964).
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serve the importantrole of coordinating informationregarding local
initiatives. In exchange for permittingstate and local governments
the flexibilityto experiment, national coordinating agencies (described below) should require state and local actors to share their
knowledge regarding implementation and compliance,"13 in order to
encourage exchange of information,mutual learning, and coordination. In workingwith these state and local actors as true partnersin
devising broad national objectives (e.g., securing women's human
rights), national coordinating agencies could then monitor compliance with these objectives through best practice performance standards developed at the local level and shared withother communities
while, at the same time, strengthening democratic accountability
through participation of people in decision making that affects
them.'04
While dialogic federalismanticipates that the federal government
will play the role of coordination, where the governmentis unwilling
or unable, other national entities could fill this gap. These entities
might include national networksof state and local governments' or

fromwhichotherstatesand
One modelforassessingcompliancewitha treaty
whichassist
localitiescould learnis San Francisco'sCEDAWgenderanalysisguidelines,
women's
guaranteeing
of CEDAW,themaintreaty
in monitoring
theimplementation
rights,
at thelocal level. See S.F. COMM'NON THE STATUSOF WOMEN& CEDAWTASK

THE CONVENTIONON THE ELIMINATION
FORCE, A GENDERANALYSIS: IMPLEMENTING
AGAINSTWOMEN (1999) [hereinafterCEDAW TASK
OF ALL FORMSOF DISCRIMINATION
FORCE, A GENDER ANALYSIS], available at http://www.ci.sf.ca.us/cosw/cedaw/pdf/

cedaw.pdf. For furtherdiscussionsee infranote 130, describingSan Francisco's
CEDAW gender analysisguidelines,and note 143, explainingthatSan Francisco's
bytheUnitedNationsDevelopmentFundsfor
CEDAW ordinancehas been identified
forimplementing
CEDAW.
Womenin itscollectionofbestpracticesworldwide
104
the
Dorf& Sabel,supranote29,at 267. Dorfand Sabel are quickto distinguish
actorsfromthe abdicationof
broad freedomtheyseek forsubnationalgovernment
in thecontextofwelfarerethinlydisguisedas experimentalism
federalresponsibility
statesincreased
formachievedthroughdevolution.Id. at 434-38. Far fromoffering
the 1996 WelfareReformAct imposeda numberof federal
freedomto experiment,
(for
on eligibility
as well as federalrestrictions
goals concerningworkrequirements,
example,by declaringlegallyresidentaliensineligibleforSupplementalSecurityIncome or foodstamps). Id. at 435 & n.541,436. Clearly,this"newlegislationfliesin
animatesit." Id. at 437.
thefaceofthelocalismthatostensibly
Cf.Resnik,supranote 17 (manuscriptat 57 n.263) (notingthatthe Supreme
offederalism
Courtmissedan opportunity
to developa morecomplexunderstanding
in
ofstateelectedofficials
whenitfailedto considertherole ofnationalorganizations
developinga nuclearwastedisposalproposalthatwas adoptedbyCongress). In New
ini505 U.S. 144 (1992), theCourtstruckdowntheCongressional
Yorkv. United
States,
it placed on states
tiativeadoptingtheproposalon thegroundsthattherequirements
principles.
violatedanticommandeering
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NGOs."'t Thus, a dialogic federalismaccount of constitutionalismdiffersfromdemocratic experimentalismin at least one criticalrespect:
it envisionsa role for state and local participationeven before there is
a federal commitmentto coordinate thisparticipation.
When it plays the coordinating role, the federal governmentmay
be able to sidestep a central dilemma that has arisen in the context of
enforcinginternationalnorms in a federalistsystem: while Congress
cannot commandeer statesunder U.S. domestic law, internationallaw
essentiallydepends on a formof commandeering.'07 On my reading,
this dilemma results in part because the U.S. federal governmentis
caught between a negative rightsparadigm that stemsfromits domestic legal traditions and a mixed-rightsapproach that captures both
negative and positive obligations, which spring from the fuller conception of rightsfound in international human rightslaw. Indeed,
internationallaw requires national governmentsto implement legislation and makes national governmentsliable for failure to bring constituentactors into compliance.'IN By workingcooperativelywithstate
and local governmentsto achieve domestic implementationof human
rights,the federal governmentneed not commandeer the states.'!'
instiSeeBenvenisti,
supranote 92, at 206 (proposinga theoryof transnational
NGOs could stepin to playcoordinatingroleswhere
tutionsin whichwell-informed
does not).
government
107
law . . depends
See Dorf& Sabel, supra note29, at 427 n.515 ("[I]nternational
legislation-whatthe Court
for its enforcementlargelyon nationalimplementing
wouldcall commandeering.").
See,e.g.,ICCPR, supranote5, at art.2, para. 2, S. EXEC.Doc. E, 95-2,at 24,999
U.N.T.S. at 173-74("[E]ach State Partyto the presentCovenantundertakesto take
or othermeasuresas maybe necessaryto
necessarysteps... to adopt such legislative
giveeffectto the rightsrecognizedin thepresentCovenant."). Note thatthe federal
can also be held accountableforviolationsof both subnationalgoverngovernment
ments,see,e.g.,ICCPR, supranote 5, at art. 50, S. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2,at 38, 999
U.N.T.S. at 185 ("The provisionsof the presentCovenantshallextendto all partsof
or exceptions."),and privateactors,when the
federalStateswithoutanylimitations
action,butfails
is on noticeand has thecapacityto takecorrective
federalgovernment
Ct. H.R. (ser.C.) No. 4, at
to act. SeeVelasquezRodriquezCase (Hond.), 4 Inter-Am.
responsibleforhuman
para. 172 (1988) (explainingthata Statemaybe internationally
imputableto itbecauseofa "lackofdue diligence
rights
violationsthatare notdirectly
to preventthe violationor respond to it"), availableat http://wwwl.umn.edu/
1_12d.htm.
humanrts/iachr/b-l
on theinefficiencies
involvedin commandeering
states,
l For a classicstatement
StateAutonFederalism: MWy
see Roderick M. Hills,Jr., ThePoliticalEconomyofCooperative
96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 893-900 (1998).
omyMakes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty"Doesn't,
WITHTHE STATE 145-57 (1993) (examining
See also RICHARDA. EPSTEIN,BARGAINING
the problems that arise when the federal governmentimposes limitson the powers of

prothe statesto bargainwiththeircitizenswithinthe contextofvariousgovernment
grams).
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Curiously,this cooperative federalismis reinforcedby a sense of
competition as well. As NGOs increasinglyattemptto use the global
marketplace as a means throughwhich to exact economic retribution
on governments(at whateverlevel) that fail to observe human rights,
this economic discipline facilitatescompetition that stimulates"races
to the top" toward improved compliance.I" This "co-petition""' approach to federalismmaintains the national governmentas a primary
site for international lawmaking and accountability,while encouraging cooperation with subnational authorities,who in turn may be incentivized to adopt human rightsstandards throughcompetitivepressures that"ratchet"standardsupward.12
III. A DIALOGIC FEDERALIST TYPOLOGY

From a dialogic federalistperspective,intergovernmentaldialogue
proceeds along at least three differenttracks,depending on the linkage between national and subnational governments. The firsttrack
involves state and local adoption of internationalhuman rightsstandards where the federal governmenthas failed to ratifya treaty. As
has been the case with CEDAW, state and local enactments adopting
treatystandards call for federal ratification,and in this sense invite
dialogue withthe federal government."' A second trackinvolvesstate
Spirogoes a step
Cf.Spiro,supranote 17,at 568-69,588-89.Note thatProfessor
thanI am preparedto go in thisArticlein thathe suggeststhatit wouldbe
further
"moreefficient"
to hold stateand local governments
liableforviolationsalongwiththe
federalgovernment
undera "condominium
responsibility"
concept-an approachthat
wouldoperatealong thelinesofjoint and severalliability
undertortlaw. Id. In additionto suggesting
applyingthestick,Professor
Spiroalso suggestsusingthecarrotapproachbyenablingstategovernments
to be treaty
partners.Id. at 590-95. As a possible precedent,he exploresthe opt-inmodel of treatyaccessionused in the trade
context. Id. at 592-93. Specifically,
Spiro discussesthe Agreementon Government
Procurement,
whichappliesto "sub-central"
governments
onlyto theextentthatsuch
entitiesagreeto coverage,as is indicatedbynotification
to theWorldTrade Organizationby the relevantcentralgovernment(withthe latter,remainingthe onlyformal
partiesto theagreement).Id. "The regimegivessub-national
in effect,
authorities,
an
optionto acceptthetreaty
regime."Id. at 592; seealsoPaul Blustein,Thinking
Globally,
Punishing
Locally,
WASH.POST, May 16, 1997,at GI (explainingthateconomicsanctionsimposedby stateand local governments
againstobjectionableforeignregimes
"raisethespecterof multi-national
companiesbeingforcedto makecostlychoicesbetweengivingup lucrativecontracts
withgovernment
agenciesor foregoing
businessin
some oftheworld'smostpromising
markets").
& BARRYJ.NALEBUFF,CO-OPETITION11-39 (deIC ADAMM. BRANDENBURGER
scribingwaysin whichcooperationand competition
can be mutually
in the
reinforcing
businesscontext).
112
Funget al., supranote 100,at 2.
Similarly,
citiesthathaveurgedtheirstatesand thefederalgovernment
to sup-
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and local effortsto implement internationalobligations that the federal government has adopted through ratificationor other acknowledgement that it is bound (for example, through the application of
customaryinternationallaw) but not fullyimplemented. As has been
the case with the consular notificationrequirement for foreign nationals arrested and detained-an obligation under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations-state and local legislativeadoption of
such requirementsinvitesdialogue with federal effortsto implement
the requirementmore fully,and in so doing may allay federalismconcerns the United States has expressed in the context of international
criticismwhere the obligation has not been observed.'14 A third
track-involving state and local effortsto apply human rightsprinciples contained in treatyprovisionsforwhich the United States has entered a reservation-is possible, but to myknowledge is stillhypothetical. In the context ofjuvenile death penalty litigation,for example,
defense lawyershave argued that the U.S. treatyreservationconcerning the prohibition on thejuvenile death penaltyin the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights"' is invalid; however,state and

port the U.N. Commission on Human Rights' call fora death penaltymoratoriummay
be read as initiatingdialogue withthese statesand the federal government.
114 For an expression of the U.S. federalism concerns in this context, see La()-and
a
Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. No. 104 (June 27), available at http://www.icj-cji.org,
case challenging the death sentences imposed on two German nationals by the state of
Arizona. In that case, the United States contended that one "constrainingfactor"on
its abilityto satisfythe internationalobligation regarding consular notificationwas "the
character of the United States of America as a federal Republic of divided powers." Id.
at para. 95. While the United States has adopted the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, it has frequentlyfailed to ensure the enforcement of the rightsof foreign
Miranda? Article36
nationals under the treaty. See Rebecca E. Woodman, International
J. KAN. B. ASS'N, June/July2001, at 41-42
oftheViennaConventionon ConsularRelations,
(suggesting that failure to enforce the rightsof foreign nationals under the Convention "not only violates international law, it weakens the status and authorityof the
United States in the international community"). Some states and local governments
such as Florida have incorporated the consular notification obligation directlyinto
state law. FLA. STAT. ANN. ?? 901.26(3), 288.816(2)(f) (West 2001). These subnational effortsinvite dialogue with federal effortsto provide for more effectiveimplementation of the treaty. See, e.g., Catherine Brown, Consular NotificationLiaison and
Legal Advisor, State Department, International Law & the Work of Federal & State
Governments, Remarks at the American Society of International Law 2001 Annual
Meeting (Apr. 4-6, 2001) ("[W]hat I have been tryingto do is get federal,state and local law enforcementjudicial and other officialsto comply with these notificationrequirements.").
See U.S. RUDs to the ICCPR, supra note 5, at 8070 ("[T]he United States reserves the right... to impose capital punishment on any person ... duly convicted
under existingor futurelaws permittingthe imposition of capital punishment,including such punishment forcrimes committedby persons below eighteen yearsof age.").
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local governmentshave not yet undertaken legislativeinitiativesto advance thisprohibitionor to repeal laws thatare inconsistentwithit.
Only the firsttrack along which dialogic federalism operates is
explored in furtherdetail here. It is currentlythe most active approach and, therefore,provides the richest source for examination.
State and local adoption of international human rights standards,
where the federal governmenthas failed to ratifya treaty,representsa
response to the federal government'sfailure to incorporate the standards. One could view with despair the federal government'sfailure
to ratifyseveral human rightstreaties,"Iseeing this as an indication
that the national government is unwilling or unable to implement
these norms through the normal channels provided under the U.S.
Constitution and anticipated by international law."7 This failure is
rooted in the structureof international law, which derives primarily
from the will and consent of national governments."8 However,
rather than view these conditions withdespair, one could also see this
failure as the result of decisions made by federal officialswho were
democraticallyelected and who, in this sense, represent our democracyat work. A dialogic approach viewsthese institutionalrealities"as
creating the occasion for, indeed in part anticipating,a radical redefinitionof our democratic and constitutionalideals.""19Therefore,

See supranote 55 for examples of treatiesthe United States has signed but not
ratified.
117
Paradoxically,the initiativetaken by state and local governmentsin supporting
human rightswhere the federal government is unwilling or unable to do so mirrors
developments in the international criminaljustice area where, under the notion of
complementarity,international institutionsstep in to enforce human rights norms
where national governmentsare unwillingor unable. See,e.g.,Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,June 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999, 1003 (establishing an international court that is complementaryto national criminal jurisdictions). Of course, in
the United States, the federal government historicallyalso has played this backstopping role, particularlywith respect to civil rights,where, until quite recently(and
to some extent today), the assertion of "states' rights"and "local control" indicated a
lack of willingnessor abilityby state and local governmentsto enforce civil rights. See,
e.g., RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLEJUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BoAI?) oFE
U,)uAcIAoN

ANDBLACKAMERICA'SSTRUGGLEFOREQUALITY748-78 (1976) (framingBrownv. Board
ofEducation,347 U.S. 483 (1954), and civilrightslegislation in general, as effortsby the
federal governmentto control local enforcementof civil rights).
118
See Christine Chinkin, NormativeDevelopment
in theInternationalLegal System,
in
COMMITMENT

AND COMPLIANCE:

THE

ROLE

OF NON-BINDING

NORMS

IN THE

INTERNATIONAL
LEGALSYSTEM21, 41 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000) ("[T]he realityis that
[S] tates and other international actors have recourse to diverse methods of setting
agendas, influencing behavior, and supplementing and shading international obligations.").
" Gerstenberg& Sabel, supranote 59, at 5.
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thisArticletakes an optimisticview of these conditions,seeing in them
an opportunityto reconceptualize available avenues for deliberation
and develop new methods that broaden and deepen consensus over
human rightslaw.
The "adoption" of human rightstreatiesand standardsat the state
and local levels largelyrepresentsa form of communication through
which people and communities,who are more effectively
able to mobilize at the local level, signifythe need for the federal governmentto
play a more active role in human rightslawmaking.'211In fact,many of
the ordinances and resolutions adopted by state and local governments explicitlycall for the federal government to adopt particular
human rightstreatiesand standards.'21 In this sense, the direct incorporation of human rights norms by state and local governments
should be seen as providing a method for creating momentum and
building pressure forchange at the federal level.
Following the approach taken in scholarship on democratic experimentalism,I am going to theorize by looking at the facts,that is,
by looking at what is actuallyhappening on the ground in two areas of
state and local activitywhere a federal role is absent: women's human
rightsand capital punishment.
1. State and Local CEDAW Activity: Despite the representations
made by the Clinton administrationto "bringBeijing home," the U.S.
governmenthas done verylittleat the federal level to incorporate the
commitments undertaken by governments at the United Nations
Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing, China, in
1995.22 An Inter-AgencyCouncil on Women was established to coordinate the incorporation of aspects of the Beijing Platformfor Action.'23 However, the work of the Inter-AgencyCouncil has been
largely symbolic.124 Additionally,the United States has yet to ratify
CfiElizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, ExpressiveTheoriesofLaw: A Gen148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1520-27 (2000) (viewing the democratic state
eralRestatement,
as a collective agent and analyzing the expressivedimensions of state action).
See infranotes 131-133, 138-141, 159 and accompanying text.
Under
See Benjamin D. Knaupp, Comment, Classifying
InternationalAgreements
as a Case Study,1998 BYU L. REV. 239, 262 ("The United
U.S. Law: TheBeijingPlatform
States has signed the [Beijing] Platform,but has proclaimed that it is not binding ....
Without a clear understanding of the legal status of the Beijing Platformand other
U.N. declarations, confusion and tension between Congress and the President in the
sphere of foreignaffairspowers willworsen.").
of InternationalHuman Rights: A
Rhonda Copelon, The IndivisibleFramework
in theU.S., 3 N.Y. CInYL. REv. 59, 77 (1998).
SourceofSocialJustice
124 Id. at 77 ("While [the Inter-AgencyCouncil] gives women a limited route to
influence government policy... the potential of the Beijing Platformis not felt be-
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CEDAW, the main treatyguaranteeing women's rights. Furthermore,
while the executive branch pointed to the Violence Against Women
Act (VAWA) as evidence of its compliance with the ICCPR in its report to the U.N. Human Rights Committee,'25 part of VAWA was recentlystruckdown by the U.S. Supreme Court.126 In UnitedStatesv.
Morrison,the Supreme Court held that Congress lacked authorityto
enact the civil remedythat provides a cause of action forVAWA.'27 In
so doing, the Court completely ignored the fact that international
human rightslaw (as incorporated into U.S. law) not only authorizes
Congress to enact effectiveremedies to challenge gender-based violence, but in fact compelsthe U.S. governmentto provide such remedies to meet currentobligationsunder the treaty.'28
While federal implementationof internationalstandards concerning women's rightshas lagged, some local governmentshave incorporated CEDAW directlyinto local law. The Cityof San Francisco pioneered this approach by making CEDAW part of its local law in 1998,
three years after the Beijing Conference.'2 With respect to the requirements imposed by CEDAW at the internationallevel, the city's
Juvenile Probation Department and its Department of Public Works
have filed reportscontaining gender analyses of theirdeliveryof serv-

cause many U.S. women are unaware of its provisions... [or] do not use it as a platformforaction or an instrumentof accountability.").
SeePress Release, United Nations General Assembly,Human RightsCommittee
Begins Considering Initial Report of United States 8, U.N. Doc. HR/CT/400 (Mar. 29,
1995) (reporting statementofJo Ann Harris, assistantattorneygeneral in the United
States Department ofJusticeCriminal Division, thatVAWA "was the most comprehensive federal effortto date to address violence against women").
126
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (concluding that Congress lacked the constitutional authorityto enact VAWA's civil remedy for victimsof
gender-motivatedviolence under both the Commerce and Equal ProtectionClauses).
127
12S

Id.

See,e.g.,ICCPR, supia note 5, at art. 2, para. 3, S. EXEc.Doc. E, 95-2,at 24, 999
U.N.T.S. at 174 (requiring thateach State partyto the Covenant take necessarysteps to
give effectto the rightsrecognized in the Covenant and to ensure effectiveremedies
should such rightsbe violated); Brief of Amici Curiae on Behalf of International Law
Scholars and Human Rights Experts in Support of Petitioners at 2, United States v.
Morrison,529 U.S. 598 (2000) (No. 99-0029) ("The text of the treaty,in conjunction
with subsequent unanimous and binding interpretationsby the internationalcommunity,make clear that the ICCPR requires the U.S. to provide protection from genderbased violence fromboth privatepersons and public officials.");seealso supra notes 5657 and accompanying text (discussing the United States' failure to enact the legislation
required to fulfillits internationaltreatyobligations).
SAN FRANCISCO,CAL., ADMINIsrRATIVECODE, ch. 12K (2001), available at
http://www.amlegal.com/sanfranadmin/lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=main-j.htm&2.0.
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ices, employmentpractices, and budget allocation.130 In signing the
cityordinance, Mayor Willie Brown,Jr.,pointed out: "[t]he United
States is the only industrializedcountryin the world thathas yetto ratifyCEDAW.''131 Sending a signal to Washington,Mayor Brown stated:
"We want to set an example for the restof the nation because it is long
overdue."132 Similarly,explaining whyher organization and other advocacy groups mobilized in support of the cityordinance, Krishanti
Dharmaraj, the Executive Director of the Women's Institutefor Leadership Development (WILD) for Human Rights said: "We couldn't
just keep waitingfor the federal government."133 While it may be too
soon to evaluate the impact of the ordinance, its value may be more
than symbolic. The cityordinance may have a concrete impact on the
allocation of services (such as extra streetlightingin high crime areas
to assist in preventingviolence against women,134and summer sports
programs forgirls), employment(in cityagencies135and in the private
137
136
sector ), and differentialarrestpatterns.

See CEDAW TASK FORCE, A GENDER ANALYSIS, supra note 103, at 14-64 (documenting the effortsmade by these citydepartments to conformwith CEDAW requirements).
Gretchen Sidhu, San FranciscoPlungesAhead in Adoptinga CEDAW TreatyofIts
Own,CHI. TRIB.,Aug. 2, 1998, ? 13, at 8.
Id. San Francisco has long been a leader in human rights,having hosted, for
example, the U.N. Conference on International Organizations, during which the U.N.
Charter was adopted. See The UN Charteras History(Jane D. Weaver rep.), 89 AM. SoC'Y
INT'L L. PROC. 45, 59 (1995) ("[T]he status of the individual in human rightsfirstreceived recognition in the San Francisco UN Conference.").
Sidhu, supranote 131.
See id. ("[E]xtra streetlights [are] something women have demanded foryears
and male cityplanners have routinelyignored.").
SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, ch. 12K.3(a) (1) (2001) ("The
Cityshall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discriminationagainst women and
girls in the City of San Francisco in employment and other economic
opportunities . .: . ."), available at http://www.amlegal.com/sanfranadmin/
lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=main-j.htm&2.0.The Cityof San Francisco is the largest employer in the Bay Area. Sidhu, supranote 131.
SAN FRANCISCO,CAL., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, ch. 12K.3 (2001) ("The Cityshall
ensure that the Citydoes not discriminate against women in areas including employment practices, allocation of funding and deliveryof direct and indirect services."),
available at http://www.amlegal.com/sanfranadmin/lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=mainj.htm&2.0; see also Sidhu, supra note 131 (suggesting that the City may be able to require that women be appropriately represented in management of private firmsbidding for citycontractsand licenses).
Women arrested in San Francisco say they are treated differentlyfrom men.
For example, Sonia Melara, executive director of San Francisco's Commission on the
Status of Women, explains that women dancers in legal exotic clubs have been arrested as prostitutes,while the male club owners go free. Sidhu, supranote 131.
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The symbolicvalue of theSan Franciscoordinance,however,cannot be underestimated.
FollowingSan Francisco'slead, theLos Angeles CityCouncil has adopted a Resolutionin Supportof CEDAW.18
Moreover,as ofAugust,2000,39 cities,17 counties,16 states,and the
of Guam had adopted resolutionscallingfor the United
Territory
Statesto ratify
CEDAW.'" Unlike San Francisco'sCEDAW law, the
resolutionsof the other citiesand statesare nonbinding. In most
as
cases,the resolutionscan be read as seekinglocal implementation
well as national ratification.140In this sense, much of the local
CEDAW workis directedtowardthe goal of buildingmomentumto
pressurethe U.S. government
to ratify
CEDAW,ratherthanenlisting
citiesand statesto functionas laboratoriesfora rangeof experimento affect
tation.14 Nonetheless,thecoordinationof theselocal efforts
national normsoperatesalong democraticexperimentalist
lines in
thatlocal governments
are learningfromeach otherthroughnational
as well as through
organizationsof stateand local elected officials,
networks
ofscholarsand activists.
Besidesthevalueofbuildingpoliticalmomentum,
thislocal treaty
workalso helps to translatebroad abstractprinciplescontainedin
human rightstreatiesinto concrete,definable standardson the
ground. Assuming the federal governmenteventuallyadopts
CEDAW,the precedentdevelopedat the local levelwillhelp inform
at thenationaland even international
implementation
level. This local workon theperiphery,
then,mayhelp redefinecore activities,
and
in so doing mayultimately
help underminethe dichotomybetween
core and periphery.'42
Los Angeles City Resolution in Support of CEDAW, L.A. City Council (L.A.,
Cal., 2000), http://www.ci.la.ca.us/csw/html/cswpge3d.htm.
WILD
for Human
Rights:
CEDAW
Around
the U.S.,
at
http://www.wildforhumanrights.org/cedaw-aroundus.html(last visited Nov. 26,
2001). Other cities, such as Seattle, are considering adopting similar resolutions. See
Seattle Women's Commission: Legislative Action, at http://www.cityofseattle.net/
civilrights/swc/legislat.htm
(last visited Nov. 26, 2001) (listing "Support any CEDAW
legislation" as one of six legislativeprioritiesforthe 2001 state legislativesession).
Cf Resnik, supranote 17 (manuscript at 52) ("[CEDAW p]roponent's goals are
to change both local and national laws; their means deploy local actors working in
concert withoutsiders.").
4
Id. (manuscript at 52-53) ("To conceive of local action as. . . indigenous to a
particular place is to miss how much of thatwork is a product of broad effortsto shift
social policy.").
149
i Cf Dorf & Sabel, supra note 29, at 445 ("[A]s democracy increasinglycomes to
mean decentralized, direct deliberation, it will be increasinglydifficultto distinguish
the citizen's participatoryrightsin these particular settingsfrom those more general
'process-perfecting'rightsto democratic participation that are frequentlytaken as the
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But, rather than take a passive role, the federal government
should play a more active role in these local efforts.For example, the
federal governmentcould use the Inter-AgencyCouncil on Women as
a national coordinating agency,pooling information,monitoringbest
practices,143 and feeding these participatoryexperiences from local
communities into the effortto build national support for federal
treatyaction.
2. Stateand Local Callsfora DeathPenaltyMoratorium:State and local calls for a death penalty moratorium often rely on international
standards. In recent years,the United States has come under intense
international criticismfor its death penalty practices.144 However,
many states continue to execute minors and allow tremendous race
disparitiesin the application of the death penalty,145in violation of international law."46 While the death penalty itselfis permitted under

most fundamental of all political liberties.").
The San Francisco ordinance has already been identified by the United Nations Development Fund for Women in its collection of best practices worldwide for
implementingCEDAW. UNITED NATIONSDEVELOPMENTFUND FORWOMEN,BRINGING
EQUALITY HOME: IMPLEMENTINGTHE CONVENTIONON THE ELIMINATIONOF ALL
at
WOMEN,
available
AGAINST
OF
DISCRIMINATION
FORMS
(last visitedOct. 25, 2001).
http://www.unifem.undp.org/cedaw/cedawen7.htm
See,e.g.,Roger Cohen, AmericatheRoughneck(ThroughEurope'sEyes),N.Y. TIMES,
May 7, 2001, at Al0 (quoting the Britishpaper, The Guardian,which called American's
position on the death penalty "morally untenable," and explaining that America's
"ease" with the death penalty is contributingto "the growing hostilityto the United
States"); Editorial, Europe's Viev of theDeath Penalty,N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2001, ? 4
(Week in Review), at 12 ("European politicians and intellectuals,who view the death
penaltyas a human rightsissue, are incredulous thatAmericans support a punishment
that fails to deter crime, targets mainly those who cannot afforda decent lawyer,is
used on the mentallyretarded and has often gotten the wrong man.").
KILLINGWITH PREJUDICE: RACE AND THE
See, e.g., AMNESTYINTERNATIONAL,
DEATH PENALTYIN THE USA, at http://www.amnestyusa.org/rightsforall/dp/race/
index.html (last visitedOct. 25, 2001) [hereinafterKILLINGWITH PREJUDICE] (showing
"how the death penalty in the U.S. is applied disproportionatelyon the basis of race,
ethnicityand social status").
For the prohibition on the juvenile death penalty adopted by the United Nations see ICCPR, supra note 5, at art. 6, para. 5, S. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2, at 25, 999
U.N.T.S. at 175; and Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 55, at 55, stating that "capital punishment ... shall [not] be imposed foroffensescommitted by persons below eighteen years of age," which is not ratifiedby the United States. For the
prohibition on race discriminationadopted by the United Nations, see ICCPR, supra
note 5, at arts. 2, 26, S. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2, at 24, 31, 999 U.N.T.S. at 173, 179, codifying member nations' obligation to protect the rightsof all citizensequally. Seegenerally
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,S.
EXEC. Doc. C, 95-2, at 1 (1965) (condemning racial discriminationand undertaking
";topursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating racial
discriminationin all its formsand promotingunderstanding among all races").
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internationallaw as an exception to the rightto life,'47the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR calls for its abolition,'48 and the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights has called for a moratorium
on executions.149
In justifyingU.S. death penalty practices to the Human Rights
Committee-the treatybody that oversees the ICCPR-during the
United States' firstcompliance hearing, State Department Legal Advisor Conrad Harper testifiedthat the decision to retain the death penaltyrepresented a democratic choiceY'' Having entered a reservation
to the ICCPR provisionbarringjuvenile executions, the United States
is one of only six nations that continues to execute minors. The
United States stands in the company of Iran, Nigeria, and Saudi Arabia as the only countries that execute people for crimes theycommitted asjuveniles.'1'
On the domestic front,there is a growing sense that the error
rates and race disparities153in the application of the death penalty
require its reevaluation. However, froma domestic political perspective,federal attemptsto restrictor regulate the states' use of the death
penalty would run afoul of federalism concerns-a point frequently
raised byU.S. representativesin internationalfora in which U.S. death

147ICCPR,supranote5, art.6, para.2, S. EXEC.Doc. E, 95-2,at 25,999 U.N.T.S.at
174-75.
148

Second Optional Protocol, supranote 5.
ResolutionSupportingWorldwideMoratoriumon Executions,Hum. Rts. Comm.

(Apr.
1999),
at
available
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/UNStatements.html#resolution
(lastvisitedOct. 25,2001).
150
U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 53rd Sess., 1405thmtg. 1 12, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/SR.1405(1995) (summarizing
testimony
by Americanrepresentatives
that
"thedecisionto retain[thedeath penalty]reflecteda seriousand considereddemocraticchoice of theAmericanpublic"and that"itwas not appropriatein thatdemocraticsystemto dismissconsideredpublic opinion and impose by fiata different
view").
America's
Shame-Killing
Kids,NationalCoalitionto AbolishtheDeath Penalty,
athttp://www.ncadp.org/html/factl
.html(lastvisitedOct. 25, 2001). Bycomparison,
Pakistanand Yemenhavejust recently
changedtheirlawsto excludetheexecutionof
offenders
undertheage of eighteen.People's UnionforCivilLiberties,
InterAmnesty
national: Childrenand theDeath Penalty;ExecutionsWorldwide
Since 1990, Apr. 2001, at
http://www.pucl.org/reports/International/2001/executions.htm.
152
See, e.g.,James S. Liebman et al., A BrokenSystem:ErrorRates in Capital Cases,

1973-1995, at http://www.law.columbia.edu/instructionalservices/liebman
(last visited Oct. 25, 2001) (presenting
statistical
evidenceto showthatAmerica'sdeathpenis persistently
altysystem
and systematically
fraught
witherror).
1See, e.g.,KILLING WITH PREJUDICE, supra note 145 (C[R]acial discrimination
pervadestheU.S. deathpenaltyat everystageoftheprocess...).
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law,however,
penaltypracticesare criticized.154Under international
violationsof
nationalgovernments
can be held accountablefortreaty
their
As
described
above,a
subnationalgovernments
and
officials.'55
wayto sidestepthisparadox of federalismis to incentivizestateand
to adopthumanrightsstandards.
local governments
themselves
callingfor a moratoriumcite internaState and local initiatives
in the sense thatinternationalnorms
tional standardsas authority,
providean interpretative
device,not bindinglegal standards.For exin Marylandas wellas
ample,in a resolutioncallingon stateofficials
federalofficialsto place a moratoriumon executions,the Baltimore
sourcethatindicatesthat
International
CityCouncilcitesan Amnesty
in
1999
in
occurred 4 countries-theUnited
80% of all executions
States,China, Iran, and the DemocraticRepublic of the Congo.156
Philadelphiahas also passed a resolutioncallingfor the Commonwealth of Pennsylvaniato impose a moratoriumon executions.'57
of the
Pointingout that"everynationin Europe and thevastmajority
democraticnationsof the worldhave abolishedthe death penalty,"
the Philadelphiaresolutionalso relies on the U.N. Human Rights
on thedeathpenmoratorium
Commission'scall foran international
'8 The VillageofYellowSprings,Ohio and the CityCouncil of
alty.

154

See,e.g.,U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 53d Sess., 1405th mtg. 1 13, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/SR.1405 (1995) (reportingthata large majorityof American statespermitted
juveniles to be tried as adults in grave cases involvingcapital offensesat the age of either sixteen or seventeen).
See, e.g., Bermann, supra note 101, at 60 ("[T]he treatyviolations for which a
nation is responsible include those committed not only by their own officialsbut also
by sub-national governments and their officials."); see also IVAN BERNIER,
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ASPECTS OF FEDERALISM 83 (1973) ("On the authorityof certain decisions, federal states are considered by most international law writersas responsible for the acts or omissions of their component units."); IAN BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 449 (4th ed. 1990) ("A state cannot plead
the principles of municipal law, including its constitution,in answer to an international claim."); Spiro, supra note 17, at 580 n.47 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, ? 207(b) & reporter's note 3
[1971] 2 Y.B.
(1987)); Reportof theInternationalLaw Commissionon StateResponsibility,
But seeJohn Norton
Int'l L. Comm'n 193, 257, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/217/ADD2).
Moore, Federalismand ForeignRelations,1965 DUKE L.J. 248, 249 (1965) (discussing the
area of "uncertaintyregarding the relationshipbetween state policies and the national
forei n relations power").
A Council Resolution Concerning: In support of a Moratorium on the Death
Penalty (House Bill 388), Balt. CityCouncil, Council Bill 00-0032 (Balt., Md. 2000).
157
Resolution: Calling for a Moratorium on the Imposition of Any Death Penalty
in the Commonwealth of PennsylvaniaUntil a Fair and Impartial Study of the Application of the Death PenaltyIs Conducted, Phila. CityCouncil (Phila., Pa., 2000).
158 Id.
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Santa Cruz, California, have also relied on the U.N. HumnanRights
Commission's call for a death penalty moratoriumin passing resolutions requesting that their respective states and the federal government impose a moratoriumon the death penalty.'5'
The federal governmenthas a role to play in coordinating state
and local initiativesthat call for the observance of human rightsstandards in the death penaltycontext. One possibilityis for the federal
government to play a coordinating role through the Inter-Agency
Working Group on Implementation of Human RightsTreaties established under Executive Order 13,107 to oversee implementation of
the Race and Torture Conventions.160In particular,the Inter-Agency
Working Group could reviewbest practices and pool informationso
that these participatoryexperiences could filterup from local communities to build support for national standards. Such support is
necessary,for example, to create momentum for a reviewof the U.S.
reservationon the ICCPR provision barringjuvenile executions. According to Executive Order 13,107, the executive branch is required
to review the appropriateness of all existing reservationsto human
rightstreaties.""
IV. THE ROLE OF INTERGOVERNMENTALDIALOGUE IN SHAPING
NATIONAL LAW

The dialogic approach to incorporating human rights law explored here engages the debate over federalism and international
lawmakingby advancing a path between the two approaches on either
side of this debate. The traditional (and predominant) approach
held by internationallaw scholars is that,as a constitutionaland practical matter,the federal governmentis the primarysite for implementation and enforcement of international law. This traditional view
takes many forms. In response to revisionistcriticswho claim federal
courts are restrictedfrominterpretingcustomaryinternationallaw on
federalism
grounds,1( scholars who followthe traditionalapproach have

Call fora Moratorium of Executions, Council of the Vill. ofYellow Springs,Res.
99-39 (Vill. of Yellow Springs,Ohio 1999); A Resolution of the CityCouncil of the City
of Santa Cruz Requesting That the State and Federal Governments Enact and Adopt
Legislation Imposing a Moratorium on Executions at Least Until Fair and Equitable
Policies and Practices Are Implemented, City Council of the City of Santa Cruz, Res.
NS-23, 806 (Santa Cruz, Cal., 1998).
Exec. Order No. 13,107, 63 Fed. Reg. 68,991-68,992 (Dec. 15, 1998).
Id. at 68,991.
162
Seesupranote 39 and accompanying text.
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defended the authorityof federal courts in interpretingcustomaryinternationallaw.' 3 These scholars draw support fromthe vision of the
nation's Founders, who, due to the failure of the Articlesof Confederation, framed a Constitutionestablishinga national government"to
articulate uniformpositions on such uniquely federal mattersas foreign affairs and international law."'I4 Additionally, these scholars
point to the Constitution's assignment of international lawmaking
powers to the federal government and divestment of such powers
from state and local governments.165 Moreover, these scholars note
thatstate and local governmentsare unrecognized as actors withinthe
structureof internationallaw."'(5Finally,these scholars argue that Supreme Court precedent acknowledges constitutionaland policy considerations underlying the need for the nation to speak with "one
voice" in foreignaffairsthrough the president.'16 In response to revisionistcriticswho claim federal courts are restrictedfrominterpreting
customaryinternational law on separationof powersgrounds,scholars
who subscribe to the traditionalview defend thejurisdiction of federal
courts over international claims, even in the absence of action from
the political branches enacting customary international law.'(i8 To
some extent, traditionalistsalso support the self-executingnature of
international law in the absence of implementing legislation from

abilityoffederal
See,e.g.,Koh,supranote 10,at 1827 (defendingthetraditional
courtsto incorporatenormsof CIL intofederallawas "a sensible,settledrule thatall
followed");Neuman,supra
stateshaveconsistently
threefederalbranchesand thefifty
note 10, at 376 (arguingthatfederalcourtsshould continueto "applyonly those
embodygenuine international
norms[of CIL] thatexternalevidencedemonstrates
legal obligationsbindingon the United States");Stephens,supranote 10, at 397
law and ofwhether
international
of the contentof customary
("[T]he determination
federalcourt
or notit appliesin a givensituationis a federalquestion,whichtriggers
and on whichfederalcourtsdecisionsare bindingon thestates.").
jurisdiction
text(pre164 Koh, supranote 10, at 1825; seealsosupranote 42 and accompanying
sentinghistoricalargumentsthatthe framersintendedthatthe federalgovernment
controlU.S. foreignrelations).
text(analyzingthetextoftheConstitution
Seesupranote43 and accompanying
retainsa virtualmonopolyoverU.S. involvement
to arguethatthefederalgovernment
in foreignaffairs).
S e.g.,Jessup,
supranote 15,at 743 ("The severalstatesof theUnion are entiSee,
law.").
tiesunknownto international
167 Crosby
v. Nat'l ForeignTrade Council,530 U.S. 363, 381 (2000); seealsocases
and sourcescitedsupranotes14-15,45 (analyzingSupremeCourtcasesand otherlegal
thatuniform
foreignpolicyrequiresfederalcourtjurisdiction).
scholarshipindicating
norms
international
See,e.g.,Koh, supranote 10, at 1842 ("[W]hen customary
urgedthefederalcourtsto detertheexecutivebranchhas regularly
are well-defined,
offederallaw.").
minesuchrulesas matters
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Congress,'6}under the theorythat political branches have already had
input in the making of customaryinternational law (through state
practice) and of treaties (through the ratificationprocess, in which
the President "makes" treatieswiththe advice and consent of the Senate). Furthermore,these scholars criticizethe practice throughwhich
political branches attempt to limit the role of the federal courts in
considering treatymatters by attaching non-self-executingdeclarations to treaties. These scholars question whether such non-selfexecuting declarations have either domestic or internationaleffect,1'"
and criticizethese declarations as violatingthe spiritof the Supremacy
Clause's declaration thattreatiesare the law of the land. 7' Relyingon
Supreme Court precedent, these scholars also argue that the treaty
power authorizes Congress to legislate in areas beyond those specifically conferred on Congress and is not subject to Tenth Amendment
limitations(at least of the non-commandeeringvariety).'7
Revisionistscholars challenge the traditionalview by claiming that
the federal government'srole in making internationallaw is limited
by federalism and separation of powers principles. The revisionist
view finds differentformsof expression that correspond to and challenge the various aspects of the traditionalapproach outlined above.
Perhaps the most prominent attack by revisionistshas been on the
role of the federal courts in determining customary international
law.'7 On both federalism and separation of powers grounds, reviISee, e.g., Flaherty,
supranote 56, at 2151-52(focusingon eighteenth-century
Britishand Americanhistory
to arguethatthetraditional
of treatiesas
understanding
self-executing
is correct);Vazquez,supranote 56, at 718 (arguingthatCongressional
actionis needed onlyin situationswherelegislative
is requiredto do "what
authority
thetreaty
makersagreedto do butlackthe [constitutional]
powerto accomplish").
a patternin whichtheSenlSee,e.,g.,Damrosch,sul/ranote56, at 515 (observing
ate triesto weakenthedomesticlegal effectof treatiesbyattachingnon-self-executing
declarationsand arguingforthelimiteduse ofthesedeclarations);Henkin,supranote
64, at 346 ("The Framersintendedthata treaty
shouldbecomelaw ipsofacto,
whenthe
treatyis made; it should not require legislativeimplementation
to convertit into
UnitedStateslaw.").
171
SeeHENKIN, supra note 56, at 201-02(callingthe recentpracticeof declaring
someapparently
treatiesnon-self-executing
self-executing
"anti-Constitutional").
172
See, e.g.,Golove,supra note 8, at 1281-83(defendingtheviability
of Missouriv.
Holland,252 U.S. 416 (1920), and arguingthattheTenthAmendment
does notact as
an affirmative
restraint
on Congress'delegatedtreaty
power).
173
The twoscholarsmostcloselyidentified
withthispositionare CurtisBradley
andJack Goldsmith. See Bradley & Goldsmith, CritiqueoftheModernPosition,supra note

11, at 856 (rejectingthe traditionalinclusionof internationallaw withinfederal
commonlaw due to a lack of "domesticfederalauthorization
forfederalcourtsto
interpret
and apply [CIL] as federallaw"); Bradley& Goldsmith,Current
Illegitimacy,
supra note 11, at 349 (defending their earlier position that "federal courts should not
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sionist scholars contend that federal courts lack jurisdiction over customaryinternationallaw in the aftermathof the Supreme Court's famous statement in Erie that "there is no federal general common
law."'174Because customaryinternationallaw is a formof common law,
revisionistsclaim that determinationsof customaryinternational law
are questions of state law that "federal courts should not apply ... as
federal law withoutsome authorization to do so by the federal political branches."'75 The federalism critique also extends to the treaty
context in the sense that revisionistsclaim Congressional treatypower
is subject to the Tenth Amendment and cannot extend to areas beyond Congress' enumerated powers.76 Additionally,revisionistsquestion traditionalistconcerns over the practice of declaring treatiesnonself-executingby insistingthat this practice safeguards the separation
177
of powers.
The main fault lines between the traditional and revisionistapproaches-federalism and separation of powers-essentially center on
questions of authority. Consider how each dimension of the debate
frames a question reflectinganxiety over who has authorityto bind
and what laws bind. Do federal courts have independent authorityto
make determinations regarding customaryinternational law (absent
action by the political branches), or does thisauthorityreside solelyin
state courts, as courts of general jurisdiction?178 Does Congress have
apply [CIL] as federal law withoutsome authorization to do so by the federal political
branches"). For earlier work on the same point, see Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist
Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665, 672, 707-16 (1986), in which
International
ViewofCustomary
he states, "courts should never apply customaryinternational law except pursuant to
political branch direction"; and A.M. Weisburd, StateCourts,FederalCourts,and International Cases,20 YALEJ.INT'L L. 1, 48 (1995), stating"[CIL] is not federal law and thus
provides no authorityforimposing limits [on the federal government]."
174
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); see Bradley & Goldsmith,
supranote 11, at 324 (arguing that to be consistentwithErie,a "new
CurrentIllegitimacy,
federal common law must be authorized in some fashion by the U.S. Constitutionof a
federal statute").
175
supranote 11, at 349.
Illegitimacy,
Bradley & Goldsmith, Current
176
See Bradley, TreatyPower,supra note 11, at 435 ("[W] hatever limitations the
Tenth Amendment does impose, it is not evident. . . whythese limitationsshould not
apply to the treatypower.").
177
supra note 56, at 2074-80 (using hisSee, e.g.,Yoo, Globalismand theConstitution,
torical and comparative evidence to respond to traditionalistcritiques of non-selfexecution as being at odds with the Supremacy Clause and inconsistentwith the Framers' notions); Yoo, Treatiesand PublicLawmaking,supra note 56, at 2220 ("Treaties cannot receivejudicial enforcementin areas thatfall withinCongress's Article I, Section 8
powers,withoutstatutoryimplementationby Congress.").
78
CompareHenkin, supra note 10, at 1559 ("[It makes no sense] that questions of
internationallaw should be treated as questions of state rather than federal law ...."),
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authorityto exercise its treatypower in areas beyond its enumerated
powers (as Missouriv. Holland held), or is the treatypower subject to
Tenth Amendment limitations reserving certain powers to the
states?179 Do federal courts have authorityto consider claims brought
under a treatywhere the political branches have failed to provide implementing legislation executing the treaty?180It is preciselyon questions of authority-specifically,
who has authorityto implement,interpret, and enforce international law in the U.S.-that the two
approaches both converge (in examining these questions) and diverge (in the answers they give to these questions). While diametrically opposed on where theycome out, as two sides framinga prominent debate, traditionalistsand revisionistsessentiallyask the same set
of questions regarding authority. For the purposes of this Article,I

Jessup, supra note 15, at 742 ('iJudicial precedent indicates] that international law
constitutesa 'federal general common law."'), Koh, supra note 10, at 1827 ("[U]nder
currentpractice,federal courts regularlyincorporate norms of customaryinternational
law into federal law."), Neuman, supra note 10, at 384 ("The [s]tates have no reserved
sovereigntyto act on the international plane; the Constitution was designed to take
that away from them."), and Stephens, supra note 10, at 397 ("[T]he determinationof
the content of customaryinternationallaw and of whether or not it applies in a given
situation is a federal question, which triggersfederal courtjurisdiction and on which
federal court decisions are binding on the states."), withBradley & Goldsmith, Critique
oftheModernPosition,supranote 11, at 817 ("[Viewing CIL as part of a federal common
law] is founded on a varietyof questionable assumptions and... is in tension with
Illegitimacy,
fundamental constitutionalprinciples."), and Bradley & Goldsmith, Current
suftranote 11, at 349 ("[I]f [CIL] is not federal law, federal courts are not to apply it
unless theydetermine thatit is part of state law.").
179
CompareGolove, supra note 8, at 1081-82 (arguing that the Tenth Amendment
does not create subject matter limitationson the treatypower because the latter is a
power delegated to the federal government), withCurtis A. Bradley, The TreatyPower
Part II, 99 MICH. L. REv. 98, 111-18 (2000) (replyingto Profesand AmericanFederalism
sor Golove and arguing that federalismconcerns limit the treatypower), and Bradley,
TreatyPower,supra note 11, at 434-36 (claiming congressional treatypower is subject to
Tenth Amendment limitationsreservingcertain powers to the states).
CompareDamrosch, supra note 56, at 527 (questioning whether non-selfexecuting declarations have either domestic or international effectas regards apparently self-executingtreaties), Flaherty,supra note 56, at 2151-52 (focusing on eighteenth-centuryBritishand American historyto argue thatthe traditionalunderstanding
of treatiesas self'executing is correct), and Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Laughing at Treaties,99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2169-73 (1999) (analyzing the text of the Supremacy
Clause to argue that treatiesof the United States do not require implementinglegislation to assume authorityas law), withYoo, Globalismand theConstitution,
supra note 56,
at 2040-69 (presenting a historical argument that treatiesshould be considered nonself-executingin order to preserve the important distinction between domestic and
international policy-making),and Yoo, Treatiesand Public Lawmaking,supra note 56, at
2233 ("[S]elf-execution would have the unfortunateeffectof reading out of our Constitutionimportantaspects of the separation of powers and federalism,and would also
undermine the principle of popular sovereignty.").
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am particularlyintriguedby the waysin which thisdebate over authorityclashes on the issue of federalism,'81 with the national orientation
of the traditionalapproach on one hand and the state and local orientation of the revisionistson the other.
I agree with the traditionalview that the Constitutionprovides a
robust role forthe federal governmentin domestic implementationof
human rightslaw. In thisArticle,I provide a differenttypeof insight
about the federal role. In outliningpossible waysin which the federal
governmentcan shareauthoritywithstate and local governments,this
Article resistsa zero-sum approach to the question of authorityand
suggeststhat norms both trickledown to subfederal governmentsand
trickleup to the federal government.82 Rather than focus on the extent of the federal government'spower to implement, interpretand
enforce internationallaw, thisArticlequestions whyall three branches
of the federal governmenttake a minimalistapproach in exercising
this power, and suggests processes for encouraging greater intergovernmentalcooperation. As regards the executive branch and Senate, this minimalistapproach suggests either lack of political will or
the presence of other prioritiesthat crowd out attentionto treatyratification and implementation. In the context of the federaljudiciary,
the reluctance to invoke or rely on international law may reflecteffortsby the bench to position thejudiciary strategicallyvis-a-visother
1
branches.
Whateverthe explanation, the state and local activitydescribed in
Part II suggeststhatsubnational units of governmentare fillingpart of
the vacuum created by the federal government'sminimalistapproach
to human rightslawmaking. More than performinga gap-fillingfunction, thisstate and local activityis directed largelyat fosteringgreater
dialogue with and involvementby the federal governmentin human
rightslawmaking. As discussed above, state and local initiativesin the

While I am also intrigued by the ways in which concerns regarding separation
of powers among the federal branches factor into this debate, these concerns are
largelyoutside the scope of thisArticle.
182 For an indication that the position advanced in this Article is consistent with
(though not identical to) the traditionalview,see discussion supra note 17 of Koh, supra note 10.
See Benvenisti,supra note 48, at 173-75 (suggesting thatjudicial timidityis not
motivatedby a lack of courage or knowledge, but ratheris resultof deeper factorssuch
as political advantage and opportunityto exert control over other branches of government); seealso Knop, suprranote 21, at 502 (disagreeing with the common view that
"judges must stillbe educated, encouraged, and acculturated to apply internationallaw
properly").
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context of women's human rightsand the death penalty signal coordinated effortstowardenlistingthe federal governmentto implement,
respectively,CEDAW and a death penaltymoratorium.
The process through which individuals and other actors demand
that government (at whatever level) convert abstract principles into
concrete law is captured by Cass Sunstein's observation that "[n]orm
cascades occur when societies are presented with rapid shiftstoward
new norms." 184 This occurs "[w]hen the lowered cost of expressing
new norms encourages an ever-increasingnumber of people to reject
previouslypopular norms,to a 'tipping point' where it is adherence to
the old norms that produces social disapproval."8' As examples of
norm cascades, Professor Sunstein cites "the attack on apartheid in
South Africa,the fall of Communism, the election of Ronald Reagan,
the rise of the feministmovement,and the currentassault on affirmative acton.,18

The concept of norm cascades is a useful one in analyzing the
waysin which state and local adoption of human rightsnorms (either
in binding laws or nonbinding resolutions) can lead to national acceptance of these norms, reflectedby policy change through federal
legislation. Perhaps the most dramatic example of this phenomenon
is the role that state and local anti-apartheidlaws played in securing
enactment of the federal Comprehensive Anti-ApartheidAct in
1986.87 A more recent example is the role that state and local antiBurma laws played in helping to pave the way for federal legislation
on Burma.'88 Ironically,the Supreme Court found that the veryfederal law thatstate and local governmentsencouraged Congress to pass
9
leaves open
preempted the Massachusettsstate law.'8 However, Crosby

CASSR. SUNSTEIN,FREEMARKETSANDSOCIALJUSTICE38 (1997).
185Id.

x?, Id.

18

7See Comprehensive Anti-ApartheidAct of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, ? 606, 100
Stat. 1089, 1115-16 (1986) (providing states and localities with temporarydiscretion to
enact anti-apartheidcontract restrictionsmore secure than those promulgated by the
federal government); see also Byron Rushing, Presentation on International Law and
the Work of Federal and State GovernmentsPanel, The American Society of International Law (ASIL) Annual Meeting (Apr. 4-7, 2001) (transcripton filewithauthor).
See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
? 570, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-166-67 (1997) (allowing the President to impose sanctions
against Burma by executive order until Burma improvesits human rightspractices and
makes its government more democratic); see also Rushing, supra note 187, at 3-4 (stating that Massachusettspassed the law "in order to put pressure on the federal government").

Rushing, supra note 187, at 5 ("[The Crosbyopinion] said that we had been
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the possibilityof enactment of state and local initiativesthat incorporate human rightsnorms domestically,
so long as these initiativesare
19
not preempted byfederal law.1
In international relations theory,political scientistsMartha Finnemore and KathrynSikkinkdescribe a three-stageprocess through
which a norm's influence in the internationalcommunitycan be understood: (1) the emergence of the norm; (2) the broad acceptance
of the norm (or norm cascade) followinga "tipping point," at which
"a criticalmass of relevant [S]tate actors adopt the norm"; and (3) the
internalization of the norm.'"' The internalization of international
norms into domestic law involves both vertical and horizontal communication among transnationalnetworksof various governmentactors (including judges) as well as nongovernmental actors linked
through technology,conferences, and other initiativesthat facilitate
globalization."2 Harold Koh explains that this internalizationprocess
facilitatesStates' obedience to international law.'3 This Article suggests that dialogic federalismmay be a vehicle for the cascading and
internalizationof norms.
The dialogic approach to human rightslawmaking explored in
this Article examines how international norms internalized at the
subnational level can be transmittedback up to the national level for
fullertranslationof these norms into federal law. Of course, adoption
of these norms at the federal level may then lead to preemption of the
verystate and local laws that paved the way for federal action-a di-

preempted by the legislation that we of course helped to pass in the United States
Congress.").
leaves open the possibilityof enactment of state and local laws that
While Crosby
promote externalpolicy initiativesas well, the Court held that the Massachusetts antiBurma law was "an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress' full objectives under
the Federal Act." Crosbyv. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000).
Martha Finnemore & KathrynSikkink,InternationalNormDynamicsand Political
Change,52 INT'L ORG. 887, 895 (1998).
See KECK & SIKKINK,supra note 96, at 3 (describing how activists,organized
around a shared idea or cause, communicate transnationallyto "promote norm implementation, by pressuring target actors to adopt new policies, and by monitoring
Law, supra note 95,
compliance withinternational standards"); Slaughter, International
at 527-28 (discussing interactionsamong "the three domestic branches of government
in each State transnationallywithone another").
Koh, supra note 96, at 626 (explaining that nations obey internationallaw "because of a transnational legal process of interaction,interpretation,and internalizaLaw?, 106 YALEL.J. 2599,
tion"); Harold Hongju Koh, WhyDo NationsObeyInternational
2659 (1997) ("A transnationalactor's moral obligation to obey an international norm
becomes an internallybinding domestic legal obligation when that norm has been interpretedand internalized into its domestic legal system.").
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lemma that may or may not create disincentivesfor subfederal action.'94 Both case studies in Part III demonstrate how this two-way
transmissionis assisted by dynamic interactions between local, national, and transnationaladvocacy networksthat facilitatethe translation of internationallaw into language that is more broadly accessible
and relevant to the general public. ' By focusing on this dynamic
process, this Article suggests that even the adoption of nonbinding
norms (such as resolutions) at the state and local level can serve as a
vehicle for the implementation of human rights.'l Dialogic federalism envisionsformalstructuresconstrained by constitutionallaw (i.e.,
hard law), through which both softand hard law norm development
are likelyto occur at the state and local level in ways that are more
visible,manageable, and intelligible. Along withother scholarship on
international lawmaking within federal systems,97 the dialogic approach suggested here may also serve to suggest new ways in which
domestic politics can intersectwith internationalnegotiations on human rights."8
The process of not only transmittingbut also translatinginternational law through networksof subnational governmentand nongovernment actors performsa dual function. First,as Sunstein's theory

194

See Rushing, supra note 187, at 3-4 (noting this dilemma in the context of the
federal law preempting the MassachusettsBurma law); supranote 189 and accompanying text (discussing the preemption of state law by federal law in the Crosby
case).
195
See KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 96, at 1-3 (describing how transnational advocacy networkspromote their policy agendas by framingthose agendas to make them
resonate for local audiences); see also Fung et al., supra note 100, at 2-3 (describing a
systemby which international firmswould compete to be recognized as ethical employers,therebyratchetingup internationallabor standards).
See Steve Ratner, Does InternationalLaw Matterin Preventing
EthnicConflict?,
32
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 591, 698 (2000) (citing the virtuesof takingsoftlaw into account in analyzing norm development and suggestingthat the "reluctance to incorporate the element of softnessinto explanations of compliance" may relate to "an implicit assumption that hard law will affectbehavior more than will soft law"); see also
Chinkin, supranote 118, at 31-34 (discussing compliance withnonbinding norms).
197
See, e.g., Bermann, supra note 101, at 59 (describing how subnational actors
have consulted with their national governments regarding their views on proposed
trade agreements); Daniel Halberstam, Comparative
Federalismand theIssue of Commandeering,in FEDERAL VISION: LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE U.S. AND
THE E.U. (Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert Howse eds., forthcoming2001) (manuscript at
1) (comparing Germany's and the United States' doctrines on commandeering),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.tafabstractjid=254147).
198
See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacyand DomesticPolitics: The Logic of Two-Level
Games,42 INT'L. ORG. 427, 434 (1988) (describing how internationalnegotiatorsmust
play a two-levelgame by attemptingto satisfyplayers at the national and international
levels).

292

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIALAWREVIEW

[Vol. 150: 245

of norms cascades suggests,the process of translatinghuman rights
norms (even in nonbinding resolutions) by ever-increasingnumbers
of nonfederal government units pushes adoption of the norm to a
"tippingpoint." At the tippingpoint, a relevantmass of actors rejects
a previously popular norm or status quo and adheres to the new
norm.'9 A second and equally important function that this normtranslation process performsis in increasing what Professor Daniel
Halberstam calls the viscosityof internationallaw. While Professor
Louis Henkin is surely correct in famously observing that "[i]t is
probably the case that almostall nationsobservealmostall principlesofinternationallaw and almostall of theirobligationsalmostall of thetime,"'201
nevertheless," [t]here are manyinstanceswhere a [S]tate is admittedly
in violation" of internationallaw.202 As Halberstam points out, "even
deliberate and considered violations of internationallaw continue to
be a practical possibility."20' Because internationallaw is a low-viscosity
system,noncompliance occurs "withoutirreparablytearing the fabric
of the governing legal orders," in contrast to a high-viscosity
system
(such as the U.S. constitutionallaw system)in which "the compliance
pull preventingexit is quite high, and the costs of noncompliance are
both certain and great.,204 Incorporatinghuman rightsnorms into lo9See SUNSTEIN,supra note 184, at 38 ("[T]he lowered cost of expressing new
norms encourages an ever-increasingnumber of people to reject previouslypopular
norms, to a 'tipping point' where it is adherence to the old norms that produces social
disapproval."); seealso Finnemore & Sikkink,supra note 191, at 895 (describing how, at
the "tippingpoint," a "criticalmass of relevantstate actors adopt the norm").
Halberstam, supra note 197 (manuscript at 10). Halberstam has also commented:
Justas the 'viscosity'of a liquid reflectsthe forcesof adhesion and frictionthat
act on a body moving through the fluid substance, so too, the viscosityof a legal systemmay be viewed as a combination of the adhesive force of its norms,
i.e. the compliance pull that its norms exert on legal actors, and the friction
caused by non-compliant action, i.e. the real costs that actors incur by noncompliance.
Id. (manuscript at 10) (relying on THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY
AMONGNATIONS26 (1990), in which Franck developed the concept of "compliance
pull"; and Harold Hongju Koh, How Is InternationalHuman RightsLaw Enforced?,74
IND. L.J. 1397, 1400 (1997), in which Koh discusses the elements of compliance,
namely,the awareness and acceptance of a rule for external,instrumentalreasons).
Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979); see also Koh, supra
note 193, at 2599 (noting thatempirical surveyshave borne out thisstatement).
HENKIN,supra note 201, at 43; see also id. at 68-87 (discussing reasons for the
persistence of violations).
203
Halberstam, supranote 197 (manuscriptat 12).
204
Id. (manuscript at 11) (relying on ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND
LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970)); see
also GEORGE W. DOWNS & DAVID M. RocKE, OPTIMAL IMPERFECTION? DOMESTIC
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cal law, state and local initiatives-particularlythose that are legally
binding-may increase the viscosityof human rightslaw in the United
States.20
In performingthese two importantfunctions,state and local initiativesincorporatinghuman rightsstandards may facilitatelegallyenforceable commitmentsat the national level. Far from adopting the
revisionistperspective that states should displace the federal government in implementing,interpretingand enforcinginternationallaw,
however,thisArticleargues that the federal governmentshould play a
strong leadership role in coordinating informationregarding state
and local effortsto publicize best practices, to distilllessons learned,
and to extractworkable norms for possible adoption at the national
level. Moreover, thisArticlestops short of endorsing more ambitious
proposals to involvestate and local governmentsdirectlyin the treaty20(6
While recognizing that subnational government
making process.
units have participated on a limited basis in the World Trade Organization (WTO),-27 in trade negotiations208 and in various international
UNCERTAINTY AND INSTITUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

77 (1995) (notingthat

(GATT "establish[es] sanctions for noncompliance that are low enough to allow politicians to break the agreement when interestgroup benefitsare great, but high enough
to encourage states to obey the agreement most of the time and therebypreventtrade
wars"); Benvenisti, supra note 92, at 196 (discussing "the opportunities for governments and small groups to evade specific [treaty]clauses withimpunity").
Note that the bindingness of state and local initiativesincorporating human
rightsnorms mattersmore in performingthe viscosity-strengthening
function than it
does in performingthe tipping-pointfunction. Here, we may consider Halberstam's
helpful observation that
[t]he viscosityof a legal systemis thus related to, but differentfrom,the characteristicsof "hardness" or "softness"of legal rules, which referprincipallyto
the degree to which legal rules are binding as a normativematteras opposed
to the degree to which theyare observed as a practical matter.
Halberstam, sulra note 197 (manuscriptat 1 n.42) (citing C.M. Chinkin, The Challenge
of Sqo/Law: Development
and Change in InternationalLaw, 38 INT'L & C(OMP. L.Q. 850,
851 (1989), which describes hard laws as those that "specifythe exact obligations undertaken or the rightsgranted" and softlaws as those that provide only for "the graduialacquiring of standards or forgeneral goals").
2See, e.g.,Spiro, supranote 17, at 569 ("I also propose thatsubnational entitiesbe
afforded some mechanism to discretely [sic] associate with formal human rights regimes.").
- Id. at 592-93. Spiro describes the plurilateralAgreement on Government Procurement's opt-in model, in which a "sub-central"government has the option of accepting the treatyregime by notifyingthe WTO through the relevant central government. Id. at 592. Central governments remain the only formal parties to the
agreement, and are responsible for the violations by subnational governmentsbut only
withregard to those "whose acceptance has been notified." Id. As of November 1997,
Spiro notes that"[t]hirty-sevenstatesha[d] indicated theirassent to the treatytermsto
the office of the U.S. Trade Representative,which in turn ha[d] transmittedaccep-
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environmentalconferences, examination of state and local government involvementin such external internationalarenas is beyond the
scope of thisArticle.210 As for internal domestic incorporation of human rightslaw, however,a strongercoordination role by the national
governmentis needed because "the Constitutioncreated the institutions of the federal governmentpreciselyto avoid such balkanization
of foreign policy and internationalaffairs.",21'An Inter-AgencyWorking Group (along the lines of theme established under Executive Order 13,107) could play such a coordination role.
Ultimately,it is in the federal government's national interest to
become more involved in monitoring and nurturingthese local efforts. Under internationallaw, the federal governmentis responsible
for treatyviolations of subnational governmentsand their officials.212
Even assuming international law eventually establishes liabilityfor
subnational governments,213national governmentswill likelycontinue
tance to the WTO secretariat." Id. at 592-93. Significantly,Spiro points out that the
"Massachusetts state law restrictingprocurement from corporations doing business in
Burma ... [became] the subject of a WTO complaint [asserted] by the European Union andJapan ... [and that it did] not appear to have resulted in the equivalent of deaccession by subfederal governments." Id. at 593.
208
See Bermann, supra note 101, at 59 (discussing states' roles in consulting with
the United States regarding trade agreements).
2' See Spiro, supra note 17, at 594-95 (discussing involvementof subnational governments at the 1992 Rio Conference on the Environment as well as at the more recent Habitat II Summit in Istanbul).
For comparative investigationsof the practice of other European countries and
notablyGermany,whose subnational governmentsparticipate in the European Union,
see Naomi Roht-Arriaza,The Committee
on theRegionsand theRole ofRegionalGovernments
in theEuropeanUnion,20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 413, 423-30 (1997), comparing Germany's, Belgium's, and Austria's national arrangements that permit subnational input into decisions on European-level issues; Halberstam, supra note 197
(manuscript at 19-31), comparing Germany,the United States, and the European Union; Tushnet, supra note 38, at 1065-71, describing constitutional federalism in the
United States; and Juliane Kokott,FederalStatesin FederalEurope: The Geman Ldinder
and Problemsof European Integration,in NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS IN THE ERA OF
INTEGRATION 175, 176 (AnteroJyrinkied., 1999), discussing "the interactionbetween
EU-level federalismand German federalism."
211 Koh, supranote 10, at 1841.
212 Bermann, supranote 101, at 60.
21
Going a step furtherthan I am prepared to go in this Article,ProfessorSpiro
has called for the establishmentof "condominium" responsibility,"under which both a
central government and its political subdivisions would be held legally accountable,"
an approach thatwould be "similartojoint and several liabilityunder tortlaw." Spiro,
supra note 17, at 588-89. Establishmentof such liabilitymay be consistentwith other
recent developments in international law establishing criminal responsibilityfor individuals accused of war crimes. See, eg., Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court Statute,June 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999, 1002. Joint and several liabilityfor subna-
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to be on the hook so long as these governmentscontinue to assert
control over theirconstituentunits.
At the same time,by cultivatingthe abilityof state and local initiatives to serve as a vector for incorporation of human rightslaw, the
U.S. governmentcould develop a broader and deeper commitmentto
human rights. By theorizingnew modes of democratic deliberation,
dialogic federalismcould enable the federal governmentto deepen its
partnershipswith subnational governments,through engagement in
dialogue and collaboration, which these state and local initiativesinvite.

tional and national governmentsmightalso be consistentwithrecent cases concerning
civil liabilityfor corporations responsible for human rightsviolations. See) e.g.,Wiwa v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 108 (2d Cir. 2000) (reversingdismissal of suit
forforumnon conveniens), cert.denied,121 S.Ct. 1402 (2001); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc.,
142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (grantingTexaco's motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens); Doe v. UNOCAL Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1312 (C.D. Cal
2000) (grantingUNOCAL summaryjudgment on plaintiff'sAlien Tort Claims Act and
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act claims and dismissing plaintiff's
state law claims withoutprejudice), affid,248 F.3d 915, 931 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming
dismissal of defendant French corporation forlack of personal jurisdiction).

